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1 A “doctrinal” article is one that describes rules of law and synthesizes them. It may also suggest
improvements or reforms. Its use of information from other disciplines is ancillary. The first author
sampled evidence articles from three periods approximately 50 years apart to assess the relative
frequency of doctrinal articles on evidence versus other kinds of evidence scholarship. To reduce the
number of articles to be read, the inquiry was limited to often-cited American  law reviews that were
published under the same name in all three periods. Examination of citation studies conducted in 1930
(Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, 9 LEGAL REFERENCE
SERVICES QUARTERLY 227, 229 Table 1 (1989), presenting material from Maggs, Concerning the Extent
to which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of the Law, 3 S.CAL.L.REV. 181 (1930)) and
1996 (James Lindgren and Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 71 CHICAGO-
KENT L. REV. 781, 789 Table 2(1996)) disclosed 10 law journals that appeared among the top twenty in
both studies. Those were the Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, Michigan Law Review, Columbia
Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Virginia Law Review, California Law Review,
New York University Law Review, Cornell Law Quarterly/Law Review, and the Minnesota Law
Review. Research assistants compiled a list of evidence articles from these journals at approximately 50
year intervals. The exact dates were chosen for index-searching convenience.  A search for evidence
articles was made in the INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS and the tables of contents of the listed journals.
The articles were read and categorized as doctrinal treatments of evidence law or other types of evidence
scholarship. (Some articles were removed from consideration after they were read and found not to be on
the subject of evidence law.)
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In recent decades, evidence law scholarship has taken on what appears to be a
permanent interdisciplinary aspect. As Figure 1 suggests rather dramatically, doctrinal
scholarship on evidence is in steep decline, having been replaced by inquiries of other
kinds.1 In pondering the wisdom and purpose of evidence doctrine, and in formulating
rules, jurists and scholars have, no doubt, always thought about background facts and
theories which today, certainly, can be recognized as falling within the domains of fields
outside of law. In recent times the links to those other fields have become more explicit
and more numerous.  We discuss where these connections have come from and
suggest where they might be headed.
2 No doubt it seems ironic to characterize something that is called “new” as being one of
the mainstays of interdisciplinary evidence scholarship. But that is the risk of any endeavor that
gives itself the name “new” – after a few decades it no longer is.
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Figure 1: Doctrinal Evidence 









In this article we review five of those interdisciplinary junctions. Three of them
seem to be established, enduring intersections of evidence scholarship and other fields:
psychology (Part I), forensic science (and perhaps science more generally) (Part II),
and the “new evidence scholarship” (the application of formal understandings of
probability and proof) (Part III).2 And we look at two important newcomers to the world





reasons, psychology is the
most important of the
interdisciplinary threads that can be woven with evidence law scholarship. Evidence law
is much concerned with the abilities of witnesses to perceive, to remember, and to
report what they have observed; and with the abilities of jurors to comprehend,
evaluate, and draw inferences from the evidence presented to them, including their
ability to assess the sincerity of lay witnesses and to understand and not be
overwhelmed by expert witnesses. All of these are psychological issues. By psychology
we are referring to experimental psychology, cognitive psychology, and social
psychology, rather than to clinical psychology. Experimental studies that deal with
topics such as memory, perception, judgment, inference, and decisions under
3 These areas of psychology of primary interest to the scholarship of evidence law are the
offspring of the marriage of philosophy and experimental physiology which took place in the latter
decades of the Nineteenth Century and the early Twentieth. Clinical psychology has different intellectual
ancestors. See generally, EDWIN G. BORING, A HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (2nd ed., 1929).
4 HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1925) (hereinafter MÜNSTERBERG).
5 An M.D. physiologist whose primary interests were in philosophy, but who along the way
became the senior American psychologist.
6 See, e.g., the four volumes of Hugo Münsterberg, ed., HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES
(1903).
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conditions of uncertainty, and of jury behavior, are plainly relevant to evidence law.3
A. Historical Background
The history of experimental psychology and law has been one of bursts of
enthusiasm followed by periods of disenchantment. At present the collaboration
appears to be on a steady footing that will make it a permanent part of the landscape of
evidence scholarship.  
1. Hugo Münsterberg
The first major event in the conjunction of experimental psychology and law was
the publication in 1908 of On the Witness Stand by Hugo Münsterberg.4
Münsterberg  had earned his Ph.D. at the University of Leipzig in 1885 and an
M.D. two years later at the University of Heidelberg. His mentor, Wilhelm Wundt, is
widely recognized as the first true psychologist, the founder of experimental psychology
and of the first psychological laboratory, at Leipzig in 1879. As a young scholar at the
University of Freiburg, Münsterberg founded its first psychological research laboratory,
attracted numerous students, and conducted a series of highly original experiments
which attracted considerable attention, quite a bit of it hostile. But Harvard’s William
James5 was far more impressed with Münsterberg’s research than with the critics’
arguments. He corresponded with Münsterberg and eventually persuaded him to accept
a visiting post at Harvard (1892-95) and later to become a permanent member of the
faculty (1897-1916). Harvard’s plan had been that Münsterberg would take charge of
the University’s psychology laboratory and become Harvard’s leading exponent of the
new experimental psychology. That worked for a time, during which he was a
successful administrator, teacher and researcher.6 But Münsterberg’s mind was so
energetic and original that he could not remain focused on basic research in
experimental psychology and ventured on into philosophy, the problems of theoretical
psychology (in which he published well regarded work), and soon founded the meta-
7 Boring, supra note __, at 428.
8 Münsterberg’s work in industrial and organizational psychology was highly experimentally
based. He looked at problems of monotony, attention and fatigue, physical and social influences on
working ability, the effects of  advertising, and helped set the stage for the future development of
economic psychology.
9 William James had been its third president four years earlier. Ernest R. Hilgard, ed., AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 21 (1978). 
10 Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr., Hugo Munsterberg: Portrait of an Applied Psychologist, 4 Portraits of
Pioneers in Psychology ch. 7 (Gregory A. Kimble et al. eds 2000),  citing M Hale, Jr., Human Science
and the Social Order: Hugo Munsterberg and the Origins of Applied Psychology (1980).  His untimely
death came in 1916. “Münsterberg died during the First World War, broken in spirit by the shattering of
his dreams of rapprochement between Germany and America and by the hostility of Americans to him in
that period of fear of Germany.” BORING, at 428-429. Also see, William Stern, Hugo Munsterberg: In
Memoriam. 1 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 186 (1917):
For many years, Münsterberg considered it his special problem to strengthen the
relations between his first and his second homelands. His books on America and the
Americans, the founding of the American Institute in Berlin, his proposal to shape the
Hamburg institution of higher learning as an embodiment of American University
ideals.... as well as many other things, testify to this. He did not always find sympathy in
these attempts either here or there. 
But at the beginning of the world war, his attitude became completely
unambiguous and unconditional. He realized that he was a German and regardless of
consequences he began at once a spiritual war against the traditional English sentiment at
Harvard. What this meant to him is shown in the following portion of a letter sent to me
in February, 1916: “... Of course almost all of my old relations are severed, especially
here in Boston. Most of my friends here no longer recognize me: I have been thrown out
of clubs and academies. All their rage has concentrated upon me. ...”
4
field of applied psychology7 – exploring applications of psychology to industry,8
education, medicine, psychotherapy, business, and, of course, the law. The range of
his interests, ideas, research and insights, is remarkable. 
One indication of Münsterberg’s professional stature might be seen in his
becoming the seventh president of the American Psychological Association in 1898.9
Later, Münsterberg became well known to the larger society, writing for popular
magazines and taking stands on issues of the day. He was an early twentieth century
media figure, widely known and much quoted, arguably the best known psychologist in
America.10
On the other hand, Münsterberg was arrogant and sometimes abrasive. Soon
after meeting Münsterberg, William James wrote that he was “vain” and “loquacious,”
“desiring to please and to shine,” with a certain “superficiality in his cleverness” but “a
11 Ludy T. Benjamin, supra , citing B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1860-1930, at 198 (1977) .
12 MÜNSTERBERG at 22. The correct time was 22 seconds. 
13 Ludy T. Benjamin, supra  n. ___
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man of big ideas in all directions, a real genius.”11 Münsterberg’s arrogance and self-
confidence, as well as his brilliance, came through in his book, On the Witness Stand,
published when he was 45 years old. Münsterberg not only was the first to discover
psychology’s relevance to the law, his insights foreshadowed much later work on
various issues, including repressed memories, false confessions, and the sources of
eyewitness error. At the same time, he scolded the legal profession for being “obdurate”
in its disregard for psychological insights that would be valuable in the courtroom. He
then proceeded to set forth a description of those insights. 
 The first chapters of Münsterberg’s book deal with problems of memory and
perception. They are written somewhat casually, suggesting the book was intended for
an audience of lawyers and other lay readers. For example, the results of experiments
conducted in class, where students were ask to estimate quantities such as time and
speed, are given as ranges (e.g., “the answers varied between half a second and sixty
seconds, a good number judging 45 seconds as the right time”12) without giving any
measure of central tendency or variance (no mean or median, no standard deviation). 
However, his basic point – that both perception and memory are trickier and more faulty
than lay people think – is  consistent with modern psychological research. In fact, one
psychologist writing recently has noted: 
The chapter on the fallibility of recall in witnesses is particularly well
developed; it draws many of the same conclusions that are part of
contemporary psychology's admonitions about the inaccuracy of
eyewitness testimony.  In fact, these contemporary accounts often cite
Münsterberg’s writings as anticipations of this modern work.13
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss crime detection, more specifically lie detection by
monitoring matters such as associations and emotions.  Always confident, Münsterberg 
believed he could detect bad acts by word association, presenting the suspected
wrongdoer with words that are neutral and words that have something to do with the
crime, and then measuring response times. Hesitation, unusual associations, and
changes in associations on repetition of the experiment will expose the wrongdoer.
Münsterberg noted that emotions can also be monitored by measuring respiration,
blood pressure, perspiration and pulse, naming the instruments but not using the word
14 One of Münsterberg’s disciples, William Moulton Marston, was later to claim credit for
invention of the polygraph.  Marston, a colorful character himself, also created the cartoon character
Wonder Woman.  Ludy T. Benjamin, supra n. ____
15 MÜNSTERBERG at 132.
16 Id. at 132. Concerning the guilty knowledge test, see, DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE,
MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY, Polygraph Test: Guilty Knowledge Tests, § 19-2.1.2[4] (2002).
17 See, Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). 
18
 MÜNSTERBERG at 181. 
19 Id. at 186.
20 E.g., Elizabeth Loftus et al., Semantic Integration of Verbal Information into a Visual
Memory, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 19 (1978).
21 MÜNSTERBERG at 183.
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polygraph, and says that this approach has promise.14 He says it is not yet ready for
use in crime detection because “experiment gives us so far no sufficient hold for the
discrimination of the guilty conscience and the emotional excitement of the innocent.”15
He suggests a form of guilty knowledge test, where hidden facts about the crime will
cause excitement only in someone (notably, the perpetrator) who knows which details
are connected to the crime.16
Chapter 5 contains speculation about untrue confessions, including case
histories and references to historical events such as the Salem witch trials. Münsterberg
offers reasons why confessions may be untrue, from melancholia to plea bargains to
the third degree. Though casually written by contemporary standards, some of the
points he makes are consistent with findings of modern research.17  Other parts seem
very speculative, such as his theory that flashing lights cause suggestiveness and
increase the risk of false confessions. 
Chapter 6, “Suggestions in Court,” makes some points about human
suggestiveness that are well-grounded. Münsterberg casually describes an experiment
in which suggestive questions planted incorrect information in subjects,18 and another in
which the size of boxes influenced ideas about their weight,19 reminiscent of later work
by Elizabeth Loftus.20 However, his idea that cross-examination using leading questions
brings incorrect answers reveals naivete about the adversarial context.21
22 Id. at 224-225.
23
 John H. Wigmore, Professor Münsterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 Illinois L. Rev.
399 (1909) (hereinafter Wigmore’s Rebuttal).
24 Id. at 399-403.
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Chapter 7, “Hypnotism and Crime,” makes broad claims for hypnotism.
Münsterberg  does not believe that strangers can hypnotize people, or that a hypnotist
could get someone to murder someone through hypnotic suggestion. He does believe,
however, that a hypnotist could get someone, through post-hypnotic suggestion, to lie
on the stand or even to bequeath all their money and then commit suicide.22
In the final chapter, “The Prevention of Crime,” Münsterberg  says there is no
single criminal type and sneers at phrenology.  Criminals are generally less intelligent,
he writes, but this can lead to many things. Environmental factors are important. We
should try positive reinforcement, not punishment, a point he supports by describing an
experiment in which subjects who had been asked to lift weights until their fingers
became exhausted did not respond to verbal attacks aimed at getting them to lift more,
but did get a second wind if the investigator modeled the finger lifting by lifting things
with his own finger. Generalizing that to the correction of criminal conduct seems an
inordinate stretch. He thought “penitentiaries” should be abolished, but also that there
should be a way to take career criminals out of circulation. 
2. Wigmore’s Response to Münsterberg
Münsterberg’s book soon attracted the attention of an opinionated and
ferociously industrious 45 year old law professor, John Henry Wigmore.  In 1909
Wigmore published  an article entitled “Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of
Testimony,” containing a root and branch denunciation of Münsterberg’s book.23
Wigmore chose a peculiar format for his response to Münsterberg. He created a
fictional case, Cokestone v. Muensterberg, brought in Windyville, Illiana.  It is hard to
see how the article could have interested psychologists.  It begins like a law school
exam, silly names and all. It laboriously states an imaginary cause of action for libel
against the legal profession and then, of all things, discusses the imaginary plaintiffs’
standing and the question whether the imaginary state had personal jurisdiction!24  One
might think that the purpose was humor, but the only attempt at it comes in the
discussion of jurisdiction, and there it misses the mark.  
Even when Wigmore approaches the point, he starts by laboriously
demonstrating that the sources relied upon by Münsterberg were not generally available
in English in publications accessible to American lawyers, and hence that it was unfair
25 Id. at 407-12.
26 Id. at 430-31.
27 Id. at 418.
28 Id. at 433.
29 The same institution where Wigmore had earned his B.A., M.A., and in 1887 his LL.B.
30Ludy T. Benjamin, supra n. ____
31 According to his biographer, Wigmore was literate in a dozen languages, including Russian,
Japanese and Arabic as well as all the major European languages. WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 106 (1977). Münsterberg was fluent in at least three: German,
English and French.
32 See Wigmore’s Rebuttal at 406.
33 Id. at 405.
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for Münsterberg to label lawyers as “obdurate.”25  This is a matter of no lasting interest,
since it does not address Münsterberg’s points about how psychology could be useful
to lawyers and jurists, but only shows Münsterberg to have been unjustified in accusing
the legal professions of being stubborn and ignorant.  
When Wigmore finally does get to the issue of whether experimental psychology
can help law, he causes Münsterberg to admit on the witness stand, mostly with yes or
no answers, that he is in error or that his suggestions are impractical.26  Where he is not
admitting that he was wrong, Münsterberg admits that he was trite – judges already
know about problems of memory and perception, as evidenced by judicial opinions from
which Wigmore’s interrogator quotes.27  At the end of the trial the jurors, after a few
moments whispering, announce that they do not need to retire, and render a verdict for
Wigmore’s side right then and there.28  Perry Mason could not have done better. 
Our evidence forefather Wigmore was quite a singular person. Who else would
write an article attacking a Harvard29 Professor of Psychology, a man whom William
James had described as a genius,30 and have the effrontery to have his adversary
confess he was wrong in the attacker’s own article?  Who else would purport, without
apparent fear of contradiction, to have read every relevant article published in the
academic psychology journals in English, German, French and Italian.31  Who else, for
that matter, would think to have the psychologist admit on the stand that, unlike
Wigmore, he was not familiar with the psychology articles published in any of the Italian
journals32 or in the German legal journals.33
34 ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Gary Wells et al., Accuracy,
Confidence and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440 (1979).
35 Wigmore’s Rebuttal  at 427-31.
36 Id. at 428-29.
37 Id. at 428-30.
38 Id. at 429.
39 Id. Almost every question by Wigmore’s alter ego would have been objectionable – this one as
argumentative, others as compound, assuming facts not in evidence, lawyer testimony, and blatantly
summing up in the middle of cross-examination.
9
As for Münsterberg’s points about the fallibility of memory and perception,
Wigmore seeks to show that lay people are familiar with those points by quoting judges
who have said the same thing in opinions. This is not a very convincing answer even for
the judges, and certainly does nothing to show that jurors are familiar with these
problems.  Münsterberg’s suspicions about lay ignorance seem consistent with later
research showing that lay people overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.34
When Wigmore gets to the merits of the association method, he effectively
demolishes it, at least in its reported applications.35  Examining one application, in
exposing a fugitive who claimed to be a bookmaker as really being a lawyer, he showed
the associations that would be appropriate for a bookkeeper were ignored by the
observer, and those that seemed consistent with a lawyer were overinterpreted.36
Wigmore also demonstrated  that the reaction time betrayals were interpreted
arbitrarily, with some seen as betrayals and others ignored.37
Here are two of Wigmore’s final questions on the subject:
Q.  Now, do I exaggerate in saying that this whimsicality and
arbitrariness of interpretation are constantly to be seen in the records of
these experiments?  For example, in Jung’s own primal experiment, by
which he is said to have detected an actual thief, did he not find a so-
called “betrayal” in the reaction “stranger-look,” by interpreting it thus: “The
young thief thought that some one had looked when he was stealing, and
had informed on him, so that I, a stranger, now knew of it?”  A.  Yes.38
Q. Does that seem as amusing to you as it does to me?  A. I do not
know.39
40 Id. at 427 (quoting Guenther).
41 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996);
JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
42 The United States Department of Justice has distributed guidelines to all police agencies in
the nation, specifying eyewitness identification procedures – based heavily on psychological research –
designed to reduce the incidence of erroneous identifications. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999).
43 A psychology scholar who has read Münsterberg’s letters noted no reference to Wigmore,
email communication from Ludy T. Benjamin to Roger C. Park,  May  6, 2002, nor could we find a
record of a reply with online research and emails asking psychology-law scholars whether they knew of
any.
44 The same year that Wigmore’s article appeared, Münsterberg published two more books, one
on values and one on the psychology of teaching. THE ETERNAL VALUES (1909) and PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE TEACHER (1909).  And the year after that he was appointed an exchange professor from Harvard to
the University of Berlin, sent on a quasi-diplomatic mission to establish an American Institute. By then
the stage was being set for the outbreak of the First World War, and Münsterberg was trying vainly to
reverse the momentum by promoting cultural ties between his two homelands.
45 Wigmore's Rebuttal at 426.
46 Id. at 433.
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Wigmore quotes a psychologist who says that most eyewitness identification is
accurate,40 an assertion that is hard to either verify or disprove, but in any event is of
little relevance: if a substantial minority of eyewitness identifications are in error, that
creates a serious problem for any system which relies on such evidence. One thing that
we know today is that erroneous eyewitness identifications are the leading cause of
wrongful convictions,41 and that psychology has contributed much to an understanding
of the conditions that lead to identification errors and to the development of procedures
for reducing the risk of such errors.42
Apparently Münsterberg never replied to Wigmore’s  attack. Our search for a
response turned up nothing.43 Most likely, Münsterberg either never learned of
Wigmore’s attack or was too busy with other projects and concerns.44
For his part, Wigmore was obviously interested in psychology himself and he had
some good things to say about it. He was receptive to experiments that used trial
simulations.45 He also upbraided the legal profession for not taking into account the
literature about crime from psychology and other disciplines.46  Here, he said, the legal
47 Id.
48 RAULFE, supra note ___, at 61.
49 As observed by D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Case of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 768 (1989):
Though not incapable of a burst of energetic and telling skepticism, [Wigmore] seems to
have been willing to accept many claims uncritically and at face value. This certainly
seems to have been the case with Osborn's “scientific” approach to handwriting
identification. [Wigmore] advocated its acceptance by all courts in his introduction to the
first edition of Osborn's  book in 1910 and continued to do so faithfully for the next
thirty years. Together their advocacy brought “scientific” handwriting identification from
a phenomenon barely tolerated by courts to a recognized source of useful and dependable
information, despite the absence of a shred of empirical evidence of anyone's ability to
do what Osborn claimed he and others of his trainees and followers could do.
Despite the absence of data and handwriting examiners’ aversion to research testing their claims, in his
treatise on evidence law Wigmore wrote of asserted handwriting identification expertise:
It ought to be now well understood that the identification and the decipherment
of documents, including handwriting and all other features, are the subject of scientific
study, made by the aid of instruments of precision, and that modern research has elevated
the whole subject into the realm of an applied science.  Under such conditions, tangible
reasons can be given for every opinion, precisely as an engineer can explain the reasons
for constructing a bridge of a certain type.  A qualified expert's opinion may therefore
now be tested and judged by the reasons on which it is based.  Such an opinion is as
much more valuable than the untrained layman's opinion as that of a scientific and
experienced geologist surpasses that of the empiric oil-prospector. 
JOHN WIGMORE, 7 A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE AT TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 1998, at 190 (3d ed. 1938) (citations to two of Osborn's books omitted). Wigmore also roundly
attacked judicial opinions which, as late as the 1930s, continued to be skeptical of and to disallow the
opinions of asserted handwriting experts. See, Risinger et al., at 768-769 n. 174.
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profession deserved the censure that Münsterberg heaped on it in other contexts.47
Later, he appointed a psychologist to be the editor of the Journal of Crime and
Criminology.48
Except for his attack on Münsterberg, Wigmore has almost nothing unkind to say
about any scientific claims, however lacking they might be in systematic empirical
grounding or however speculative and exaggerated. Perhaps the most remarkable
contrast is provided by Wigmore’s support of the admission of handwriting experts in
court, a cause on behalf of which he waged a campaign for decades, despite the
complete lack of any testing of the validity of their claims.49 The difference cannot be
that Wigmore’s handwriting examiner friend, Albert S. Osborn, confined himself and his
field to one small corner of the evidence universe. Osborn published a number of books
in which he expounded on his speculations about inference, proof, trial practice, and
50 ALBERT S. OSBORN, THE PROBLEM OF PROOF (1922); ALBERT S. OSBORN, THE MIND OF THE
JUROR (1937).
51 That, at least, is the theory put forward by some commentators. See Risinger et al. supra note
__. Another possibility is political. Münsterberg favored rapprochement between the U.S. and Germany
as tensions mounted in the period leading to the First World War, and he supported Germany’s position
against her European adversaries. His public support of Germany in speeches and in the popular press
caused him problems with his Harvard colleagues as early as 1907. Wigmore’s feelings toward
Münsterberg could only have grown worse. Münsterberg continued to support Germany even after war
broke out in 1914 and even after the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915. None of this could have been very
pleasing to Col. Wigmore, the war hawk and patriot.
52 John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale
Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 474 n. 83 & 480 n. 101 (1979). Wigmore’s attempt to undermine
Hutchins not only was small-minded and cruel, it almost certainly fell on unreceptive ears. Angell was
himself a psychologist, having done graduate work at Harvard under William James, graduating the same
year that James first succeeded in luring Münsterberg there. After Harvard, Angell went to Germany for
further study, returning to the U.S. to found the University of Minnesota’s first psychology laboratory.
Angell was the fifteenth president of the American Psychological Association (1906). Angell briefly was
president of the University of Chicago (1919-1921), before moving to the presidency of Yale (1921-
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related matters, all of which were praised by Wigmore.50 Whatever lack of thoroughness
in testing and insufficiently cautious extrapolations Münsterberg indulged in, they pale
next to Osborn’s, which stand on nothing but anecdote and ipse dixit. 
What, then, accounts for the special abuse Wigmore heaped on Münsterberg?
The difference may be that while others showed respect for the intellectual structure of
the law (for which Wigmore reciprocated by showing respect for whatever those others
were peddling), Münsterberg had the impudence to criticize the legal factfinding
process as suffering from fundamental flaws (to which Wigmore also reciprocated).51
In any event, the lengths to which Wigmore went in putting painstaking erudition
to the service of vitriolic attack must, to the extent that it was known to them, have had
a chilling effect on psychologists less bold than Münsterberg. Wigmore certainly did the
discipline of psychology and evidence law no favors with his Illinois article. And when a
bright young Yale law  professor, Robert M. Hutchins, who had just begun to teach
evidence for the first time, delivered a paper on evidence at a 1926 meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, at a round table on “Psychology, Deception
Tests, and the Law of Evidence,” Wigmore found the paper highly objectionable.
Wigmore immediately wrote to Hutchins warning him away from experimental
psychology and telling Hutchins to read the reply to Münsterberg. For good measure,
Wigmore wrote a letter to the President of Yale University, James R. Angell, warning
him of Hutchins’ “extreme behaviorism” and his “irreverence towards judges and
recorded experience.” Angell sent the letter on to Hutchins, with a note saying, “I have
the impression that you must have stepped on some of his most sensitive corns.”52
1937). Before becoming a professor at the law school, Hutchins had been secretary of the Yale
Corporation, and therefore probably already had a good relationship with President Angell. The year
after Wigmore wrote his letter, Hutchins was named dean of the law school at Yale (1927-1929),
following which he became the president of the University of Chicago, where he served for two decades.
53 Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Consciousness of Guilt, 6 U. PA. L. REV. 725
(1929); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - State of Mind in Issue, 29 COLUMBIA L. REV. 147
(1929); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - State of Mind to Prove an Act, 38 YALE L. J. 283
(1929); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - The Competency of Witnesses, 37 YALE L. J. 1017
(1928); Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929);
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Memory, 41 HARV. L. REV. 860 (1928); Some Observations
on the Law of Evidence – Spontaneous Exclamation, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 437 (1928).
54 DUXBURY, supra note __, at 87-88.
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Hutchins was not the least deterred. He took on a psychologist as a collaborator and
together they wrote prolifically on psychology and evidence law. But others may well
have been deterred. 
One wonders what the body of psychology and evidence law scholarship might
have developed into, and how much sooner, if the initial encounter had not been
hobbled by the overreaching of its first important contributor and the overreaction of its
first important critic.
3. Hutchins and Slesinger
The next landmark in psychology and evidence law is the Hutchins & Slesinger
series in the 1920s.53 Hutchins and Slesinger wrote articles in leading law journals
about the pertinence of psychology studies to such evidence questions as the
admissibility of spontaneous exclamations, refreshing memory, evidence of statements
offered to prove state of mind and consciousness of guilt, marital privileges, and the
competency of witnesses to testify. 
Hutchins, a recent graduate of Yale Law School who joined its faculty in 1925
and became dean in 1927, while still in his late twenties, brought a psychologist, Donald
Slesinger, to the Yale law school faculty to work with him on psychological studies of
evidence law. Neil Duxbury, in his book, Patterns of American Jurisprudence, credits
Hutchins with playing “the crucial” role in setting the scene for the emergence of realism
at Yale during the 1930s, and Hutchins certainly shared the realist interest in studying
law with the methods of social science.54
Hutchins originally intended to do experimental work, but the articles he actually
produced were examples of scholarship by consumers of social science, not
scholarship by makers of social science.  Professor Schlegel’s appraisal is that: 
55 Schlegel, supra note __, at 482.
56 Hutchins & Slesinger, Spontaneous Exclamation, supra note __, at 437.
57 The long established and well known Yerkes-Dodson law relating arousal to performance.
Robert M. Yerkes & John D. Dodson, The Relation of Strength of Stimulus to Rapidity of
Habit-Formation, 18 J. COMPARATIVE NEUROLOGY & PSYCHOL. 459 (1908).
58 Hutchins & Slesinger, Spontaneous Exclamation, supra note __. 
59 Incidentally, the Morgan/Hutchins and Slesinger interaction is an example of cross-
fertilization by doctrinal and interdisciplinary scholars that we could hope to emulate today.  In 1922
Morgan had published an article in the Yale Law Journal making this suggestion. Edmund Morgan, A
Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).  It is a classic
work of doctrinal scholarship.  Morgan looked at the types of out-of-court statements that courts had
been receiving as res gestae evidence, suggested a functional reclassification of those cases with
different labels, and explained why as a matter of policy each of the classes he suggested should be
admissible in evidence. Hutchins and Slesinger later found this work of classification, explanation and
fireside policy analysis helpful in understanding how courts treat spontaneous exclamations and how the
14
The articles were of a generally high quality, although their effectiveness
varied directly with respect to the quality and relevance of the underlying
psychological literature: where good quantitative, behavioral studies were
available, the articles were crisp and their criticisms effective, where an
older, introspective psychology or new Freudian psychology provided the
studies, the articles tended to be less well focused and their criticisms
weak.55
Several of the articles are of continuing interest. For example, in the
spontaneous declarations article,56 Hutchins and Slesinger describe a study – one that
might not get past a present-day human subjects committee – in which the investigator
staged a battle in the classroom. Consistent with other psychological research57 on the
effects of stress and arousal, students who were highly upset were least accurate. The
most accurate students were the ones who were slightly stimulated; they wrote better
descriptions than the ones left cold.58
Interestingly, Hutchins and Slesinger did not recommend the abolition of the
excited utterance exception. They said that the excited utterances then admitted by the
courts, many of which required not only excitement but also personal involvement by
the declarant, were less accurate than other spontaneous declarations excluded by the
courts. In a conclusion that is consistent with the modern approach to present sense
impressions under the Federal Rules of Evidence, they supported Professor Morgan’s
suggestion that declarations “closely connected in time” with the stimulus that brought
them forth be admitted, whether excited or not and whether or not the declarant was a
participant.59
doctrine might be reformed in light of findings in psychology. Spontaneous Exclamation, supra note __.
That is as it should be. 
60 Hutchins & Slesinger, Memory, supra note __. 
61 Hutchins & Slesinger, Memory, supra note __, at 863, 870.
62 Schlegel, supra note __, at 585-86.
15
  Hutchins and Slesinger’s memory article60 offers psychological perspectives on
legal doctrines about impeachment of witnesses, refreshing memory, and past
recollection recorded.  The authors concluded  that impeaching witnesses by
questioning them on cross-examination about otherwise irrelevant matters – e.g., cross-
examining a witness to a contract transaction about the ages of his grandchildren – was
psychologically invalid because human memory is highly situational.  They argued that,
where time and cost justify it, memory tests developed by psychologists would be
better.61  Hutchins and Slesinger concluded that the past-recollection-recorded doctrine
was basically sound, but that it should be refashioned to some extent to take
psychological factors into account, such as the forgetting curve, which rises quickly and
then flattens out.  Among the things they recommend taking into account is whether the
event was “definitely attended to” by an observer who was “determined to remember
everything that happened.”  In the absence of those factors, they argued that one
should consider the length of time and number of times the event was “exposed,” and
the length of time since the last “exposure,” in that way taking advantage of what is
known about the forgetting curve. They approved generally of the concept of refreshing
recollection, noting that it follows the psychological insight that recognition outlasts
recall.  But they worried about false memories caused by confusion with post-event
information.  Their recommendations on refreshing recollection are implicit and hence
indeterminate, but they did identify factors that factfinders and perhaps policymakers
should consider in determining accuracy. 
As dean at Yale, Hutchins encouraged other realist projects in law and social
science, undertaken by such faculty members as Charles Clark (on court administration
and who later became the principal draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure),
William O. Douglas (on bankruptcy, later a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court), and
Underhill Moore (studies of banking and compliance with traffic laws). Like other realist
initiatives in law and social science, the Hutchins and Slesinger work just petered out. 
They never did experimental work themselves.  The whole field of law and any social
science was somewhat dormant for a time, suffering from lack of funding during the
depression and a redirection of the energies of realist leaders during the depression
and the Second World War.62
63 DUXBURY, supra note __ at 213.
64 DUXBURY, supra note __, at 90 (citing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 152 (1973). 
65 DUXBURY, supra note __ at 213.
66 Robert Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, 1 CHI. L. REV. 511 (1934).
67 Id. at 513.
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Hutchins departed for the University of Chicago in 1929.63  According to some
sources, he became an “apostate realist”64 who turned his back on empirical work as
merely descriptive and who favored a metaphysical search for “first principles of law.”65
In 1933, as the 34-year old President of the University of Chicago, he gave an address
to the Association of American Law Schools that was later published in the University of
Chicago Law Review under the title, “The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student.”66 In it,
Hutchins said he had looked to psychology for behavioral insights relevant to the law of
evidence.  He discovered that psychology had dealt with very few of the issues raised
by the law. It could tell you that spontaneous exclamations were not accurate, but it
could not tell you whether they should be excluded.  Psychologists, he said, “did not
know enough about juries to tell you that; nor could they suggest any method of finding
out enough about juries to give you an answer to that question.”67 This opinion by the
prominent university president and law professor, offered in an AALS address, must
have been discouraging to scholars who were thinking of following in his path. Note,
however, that it is not a wholesale condemnation of experimental psychology and law. 
Like parts of Wigmore’s earlier attack, it can be read as a call for ecological validity – for
realistic simulations of trials and realistic studies of jury behavior.
4. Subsequent Developments
The late 1930s and 40s were a dry period, not only for psychology and evidence
law but for all forms of behavioral science and law.  But the idea that social science
research would be helpful to legal scholars was too ingrained in the post-Langdell legal
mind to die.  Law professors had a positivist, functional approach to law, and if law was
man-made and mutable, and it was important to consider its social consequences, then
the social and behavioral sciences could not be ignored for long.  It was against the
temper of the times to avoid trying to use science in law, including social science.
Leaders like Holmes and Pound had called for it before the realist era, and even
Langdell invoked a scientific paradigm, though his concept of law as science hardly led
to interdisciplinary work.   
Hutchins himself did not completely turn his back on interdisciplinary work with
law and social science.  He participated in a curriculum reform at Chicago that resulted
68 DUXBURY, supra note __ at 90, n. 119 (quoting JOHN W. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL
CULTURE, 1908-1940 138 (1981).
69 Schlegel, supra note __, at 238-40.
70 KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
71 PAUL ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 182-188 (1972).
72 See Kermit L. Hall, ed., OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW, 489 (2002).
73 The Russell Sage and the Walter E. Meyer foundations made grants to Wisconsin, Berkeley,
Denver, and Northwestern. Id.
74 E.g., insanity defense, diminished capacity, competence to stand trial, civil commitment. See,
Tom Grisso, A Developmental History of the American Psychology-Law Society, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
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in the inclusion of a course in psychology in the law school curriculum.68 In 1951, after
Hutchins became an associate director of the Ford Foundation, Ford funded the
landmark study of The American Jury, conducted at the University of Chicago Law
School by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel.69 The Kalven and Zeisel study, published in
1966, is recognized as one of the brightest lights in the law and social science
firmament.70
Another signal event was the use (or misuse) of social science data in Brown v.
Board of Education.71 Regardless of what one thinks of the Supreme Court’s famous
footnote 11, it made the possibilities salient. But the revival of psychology and evidence
law had to await the 1970s. 
In the early 1960s, the “law and society” movement emerged, largely as a
collaboration between legal scholars and social scientists (including sociologists,
political scientists, anthropologists, psychologists, and historians). The legal scholars
wanted to expand law and legal scholarship beyond its doctrinal habits, hoping to
incorporate empirical social science methods and knowledge into the law school
curriculum and to hitch their own scholarship to methodologies and substantive
knowledge which they saw holding much promise for the law.72 The social scientists
saw in their collaboration with the lawyers an expanded opportunity to contribute to
progressive social change. Two charitable foundations were persuaded to make
substantial grants to four universities to help advance these interdisciplinary efforts.73 In
1964 the Law & Society Association (L&SA) was formed. As anyone involved with law
schools can see, the integration of fields did not take hold, and spread little beyond the
original schools, though the L&SA thrives. 
The American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS) was formed in the late 1960s,
initially by psychologists interested in mental health law issues.74 In a straw vote on
213 (1991).
75 Id. at 218. 
76 JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (1970).
77 Law and Human Behavior, whose citation count now rivals that of the top law journals.
See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 389 (2000).  Law and Human
Behavior ranked first in the “specialized” category with 2,364 cites for the period 1987-97. Id. at Table
3.  In the “general” category, the Yale Law Journal was first with 7,121 citations.  The count of Law and
Human Behavior placed it just ahead of the tenth-ranked “general” law review (the California Law
Review, which had 2,359 cites).  Id. at Table 2.  This is all the more remarkable considering that LHB
has, up to the present, not allowed itself to be included in Westlaw or Lexis.
78 Grisso, supra note __, at 224.
79 ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
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naming the organization, the name that got the most votes in 1968 was “Society for
Forensic Psychology.”75 But under the name AP-LS, the new organization's constitution
identified its purposes as promoting a range of interests, including the psychological
study of law. The organization's more influential founder and first president, Jay Ziskin,
was a lawyer as well as a psychologist, who went on to write a book cataloguing the
weaknesses of clinical expert testimony.76 Though the book alienated many forensic
psychologists from Ziskin, it along with AP-LS was a reflection of his desire to see
psychology better serve law by promoting improved expert testimony through better
scientific research. 
Partly due to that conflict, the young organization struggled to gain its footing.
But as it approached the end of its first decade it came under the influence of the field's
most influential leader, Bruce Sales, who served as its eight president. Sales had
doctoral training in psycholinguistics as well as a law degree, and almost
singlehandedly created the infrastructure of modern law and psychology. He personified
the field's varied embryonic interests, imbued AP-LS with his own boundless energy,
founded the field’s first journal,77 first book series, and first joint JD/Ph.D degree
program. He "provided AP-LS with a structure and purpose that was dramatically more
coherent and dynamic than anything it had in its earlier stage. He conceptualized a field
of law and psychology that incorporated all of its facets...."78 He and his students also
produced a disproportionate amount of the research that initially filled the journals and
that was presented at the conferences. 
One of the first topics of major and continuing research has been eyewitness
identification accuracy, an initiative of psychologists, not law professors. One of the
early modern landmarks on this subject was Elizabeth Loftus’s book, Eyewitness
Testimony, published by the Harvard University Press.79
80 BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 68 (1995).
81 Id.   
82 Michael J. Saks, The Law Does Not Live by Eyewitness Testimony Alone, 10 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 279 (1986) (“I have received many papers devoted to the study of eyewitness phenomena; more,
in fact, than any other category. Yet the subject of eyewitnesses will occupy at the most only a few hours
of a law student's academic life; only a fraction of the thousands of annual pages in law reviews; can be
only one of a large number of issues a judiciary committee will address itself to in a year's policy
making.”)
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B. Three Contemporary Stories of Success and Its Alternatives
1. Eyewitness Identification Research 
There are literally hundreds of studies on the subject of eyewitness testimony;
one bibliography of eyewitness research lists 2,000 entries, most of them scientific
studies.80 The body of research, both field studies and laboratory studies, has been
growing at an increasing rate.81 On many questions, the findings show a high degree of
convergence. Moreover, the research, unlike that of Münsterberg or that reviewed by
Hutchins & Slesinger, shows a high degree of sensitivity to the legal context. The
researchers do not stop at identifying factors, such as weapon focus, that create poor
witnessing conditions. They also study witnessing within the legal system.  
The weakness of eyewitness identification would not be such a concern if jurors
gave it proper weight. But are jurors sensitive to witnessing conditions and problems? 
This topic has had the benefit of a substantial amount of sophisticated research.  Do
eyewitness experts help jurors understand? That has also been the subject of
controlled experiments.  Do judges and lawyers understand problems with witnessing
conditions?  Can judicial instructions help?  Is cross-examination and adversarial
testing sufficient to alert jurors to the dangers?  All of these context issues have been
the subject of empirical research by scholars in the field – just what Wigmore and
Hutchins were asking for and bewailing the absence of. 
The topic had become so popular that one of us, when editor of Law & Human
Behavior, wrote an editorial warning psycholegal scholars that the usefulness of their
work can be limited by the range of topics that they have chosen to address.82 It even
received notice on the pages of the New Yorker, in an article by Atul Gawande, who
struck a tone similar to Münsterberg: 
[The] legal profession has conducted no further experiments on the
reliability of eyewitness evidence, or on much else, for that matter. 
Science finds its way to the courthouse in the form of ‘expert testimony’ –
83
 Atul Gawande, Under Suspicion, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2001, at 50. 
84 Thus, Gawande’s criticism is unfair, at least as it pertains to eyewitness identification
research. 
85 See CUTLER AND PENROD, supra note __, at 171-212.
86
 See Jon R. Waltz & Roger C. Park, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 935-45 (10th Ed.
2004); Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES,
AND PROBLEMS 599-600(4th Ed. 2000).
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forensic analysis, ballistics, and so forth. But the law has balked at
submitting its methods to scientific inquiry.  Meanwhile, researchers
working outside the legal establishment have discovered that surprisingly
simple changes in legal procedures could substantially reduce
misidentification. They suggest how scientific experimentation, which
transformed medicine in the last century, could transform the justice
system in the next.83
In contrast to a century ago, today research on eyewitness testimony is far more
complete, much of it is more carefully related to the legal context, and more legally
sophisticated. And this time around, the legal academy has itself been much more
receptive to and sophisticated about the research.84
Psychologists have studied the effect of eyewitness age, eyewitness sex, sex of
the target person, training of eyewitnesses (such as bank tellers) in how to identify, the
dubious value of consistency of description and eyewitness confidence, the effects of
disguise and weapon focus, the rate of decay of memory, the effects of post-event
information (such as seeing mugshots before making a lineup identification), exposure
time, distinctiveness of the target, length of retention interval, encoding instructions,
biases in lineup structure and composition, the effect of context reinstatement (having
the eyewitness do the identification in the same surroundings as the crime), live v. video
v. still pictures at exposure and at identification, and the difficulties of cross-racial
identification and whether people with friends of another race are better at it than
others. Psychologists also have done studies of jurors, finding that juror subjects often
overemphasize factors that have only a weak relationship to accuracy, such as witness
confidence, and underestimate other factors, such as the witness’s age, the effect of
disguise, or the distinctiveness of the target person.85
What have been the legal consequences of this research?  One important area,
dealt with in the evidence casebooks, is the question whether expert testimony is
admissible to alert jurors to the dangers of eyewitness identifications (pointing out the
factors which increase or decrease eyewitness accuracy).86  Most courts continue to
hold that it is within the discretion of trial judges to exclude this evidence, but there are
87
 For leading cases holding exclusion of expert testimony about eyewitness identification to be
an abuse of discretion under the circumstances, see State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz 1983) and 
People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Calif. 1984).
88 Gary Wells, Mark Small, Steven Penrod, Roy Malpass, Solomon Fulero, and C.A.E.
Brimacombe, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads,
23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1998).
89
“Relative judgment” is the phenomenon whereby eyewitnesses tend to select the person in the
lineup who comes closest to looking like the perpetrator rather than the person they believe is the
perpetrator.
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exceptions,87 and of course there are trial judges who exercise their discretion in favor
of admitting it, especially when it has a good fit to the facts of the case and the
eyewitness identification is crucial.  
More recently, the research has had an even more important effect on the
administration of justice. It has suggested policy for the conduct of eyewitness
identification procedures in order that the risk of erroneous convictions be minimized,
without increasing the risk of erroneous failures to identify. The AP-LS produced a white
paper on eyewitness identification by a number of leading eyewitness researchers.88
Their recommendations included: 
• preventing witnesses from discussing the incident with each other prior to
attempting their identifications (by instruction and, when possible, by
sequestration)
• selecting lineup foils (or fillers) to resemble the witness’s description
(rather than to resemble the suspect)
• blind administration of lineups (police officers interacting with the witness
should not know who the suspect is)
• instructing the witness that the culprit might or might not be in the lineup
(in order to reduce relative judgment89)
• sequential lineups or photospreads (whereby witnesses see one lineup
member at a time and must declare whether that person is or is not the
perpetrator, also designed to reduce relative judgment).
• recording the confidence of the witness immediately following any
identification (in view of the high persuasiveness of this relatively
unimportant element, and the malleability of confidence after the witness
receives confirming or disconfirming post-identification information)
90 Supra note __.
91 Police representatives on the DOJ task force felt that a requirement of blind administration
reflected a lack of “trust” in officers conducting lineups. They agreed that officers should not give cues to
witnesses as to who the officer knew the suspect to be, but that they could accomplish this by willing
themselves to behave properly. Interestingly, blind protocols are common in scientific research, where
those scientists do not feel at all demeaned to impose blind testing regimes on themselves and see good
methodology as the surest path to accurate results. Gary Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police
Station: A Successful Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581 (2000). 
92
  Thomas P. Sullivan, Preventing Wrongful Convictions – A Current Report from Illinois, 52
Drake L. Rev. 605, 607 (2004).
93
 Gary L. Wells,  7 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L. 791, 791 (2001).
94 H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in
the Courtroom, 130 U.PA.L. REV. 845 (1982).
95 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho- Bayesian [!?]
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637 (1991); Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of
Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L. J. 221 (1996);  Miguel A. Mendez,
California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent
Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1003, 1041-60 (1984); Roger C. Park, Character at the
Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 717 (1998). 
96 For legal scholars who have used the psychology literature to support an especially  strong
view of the uselessness of character evidence, see Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A
Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5, 32 (1988); Robert G. Spector, Rule 609: A Last
Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 334, 351 (1979); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to
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The United States Department of Justice has adopted most of these recommendations
and advised all police agencies throughout the nation to follow them.90 The one that the
Justice Department task force did not adopt was blind testing.91  Others have gone
further.  The Illinois Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment recommended
double-blind lineups and the General Assembly funded a limited program of
implementation and study of the procedure.92 New Jersey has adopted double-blind
lineups on a statewide basis.93
2. Research Relevant to the Character Evidence Ban 
The legal literature on character evidence has varied in its use of insights from
academic literature on psychology. Professor Uviller produced an influential article  on
character evidence without expressly relying upon insights from the psychology
literature.94 Other articles do cite and discuss the literature on psychology, but are
relatively cautious in their use of it.95  Still others have been more daring, using
personality theory to argue that character evidence is worthless or virtually worthless.96
Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26 (1986-87). 
But see Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27
CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 535-36 (1991) (using  personality theory to argue that opinion and specific-acts
evidence on character should be admissible during the prosecution's case in chief.)
97 See John M. Darley and C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCH.
100 (1973) (study of effect of being in a hurry on seminarians’ behavior in helping strangers). 
98 See Robert G. Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA L. REV. 334, 351
(1979) (“Character evidence used as a basis for predicting human behavior is useless . . . the legal
conclusion therefore ought to be that evidence of character has no probative value”); David P. Leonard,
The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 26 (1986-87) (“[A]s currently conceptualized by the law, character evidence often fails the test
of logical relevance”); Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: a Recommendation for Reform,
57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 32 (1988) (“Social psychology data reflect the conclusion that prior convictions
have virtually no probative value as a predictor for determining a witness' in-court veracity”).  Cf. Robert
G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 758, 783 (1975).
99 For a description of these experiments, see Ross & Nisbett, supra note —, at 119-44 (1991).
100 Sometimes old research is every bit as good, or better, than the most recent studies. Here, we
use the elderliness of research as a shorthand for research which has been supplanted by better and more
complete research, leading to different overall conclusions.
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The theory that character evidence lacks probative value finds support in a view
of personality that sees situational pressures as being more important as a cause of
human behavior than are general traits of character.  Thus, whether a person is in a
hurry to keep an important appointment is likely to be a more powerful determinant of
whether he will stop to help someone in distress than what we can find out about that
person’s general disposition toward self-sacrifice.97  Some legal scholars have used
“situationist” personality theory to argue that character evidence ought to be broadly
excluded.98  They have found further support in studies of “fundamental attribution
error,” studies showing that people tend to attribute too much power to dispositions and
too little to situations.  For example, when experimental subjects are asked to predict
how people will react in certain situations where behavior has been tested in prior
experiments, they tend to err on the side of underestimating the power of situations.99
Two dangers are present in applying this body of literature to legal issues:  First,
there is the danger of using psychology that is too little, too selective, and too old.100
Second, there is the danger of using research that does not  generalize to the legal
situation. The first flaw is somewhat hard to avoid.  We can’t expect law professors to
be on the cutting edge of research in another field.  Still, one can take precautions
against the danger of old and selective research. It is tempting to take one’s psychology
101 For an example, see David Crump, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to
Prove Conduct?, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279, 283 n. 10 (1987). Professor Crump reviewed two college
textbooks to check the current status of trait theory, noting that, “Both of these books were used as texts
in courses offered at the University of California (Davis) in 1987 and were purchased at the campus
bookstore by the author of this Essay.” Admittedly, following Professor Crump’s example would put
legal scholars in the unwonted role of paying money for books, but perhaps interlibrary loans or faculty
expense accounts could soften the blow.
102 See articles cited in supra notes ____.
103 HUGH HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928).
104 WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968).
105 See Hartshorne & May, supra note ___, at 90-103. 
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from law review articles and empirical studies cited in them, but something more needs
to be done, even if it is only to check one’s conclusions against recent editions of
standard college texts on the subject.101 Or, better yet, law professors should follow
Hutchins’s example and take a psychologist as a co-author.
Having a psychologist co-author does not solve the second challenge, that of
making sure that the psychological literature “fits,” that is, that it generalizes to the
relevant legal context.  That requires examination of the underlying literature and use of
the basic skill exercised by doctrinal scholars, that of drawing distinctions. Sensing the
lack of generalizability does not require  going to somebody else’s library and digging
through poorly indexed psychology journals. One only needs to look at whatever
psychology research was cited and think about its applicability to the trial context.  For
example, the two works most heavily relied upon in law review articles102 were
Hartshorne and May’s massive 1928 work103 and Walter Mischel’s 1968 book,
Personality and Assessment.104 These were seminal works, deservedly influential in
psychology. In assessing their applicability to issues of evidence law, however, legal
scholars need to consider the behavior examined in those works and compare it to the
behavior at issue in those situations where the law admits or excludes evidence of
character.
Hartshorne and May studied deceptive behavior in thousands of schoolchildren.
Under observation, children were given the opportunity to steal coins, to lie, or to cheat
on a test.105  The authors compared childrens’ propensity to engage in different kinds of
dishonest or deceptive behavior – for example, cheating on self-graded classroom tests
compared to stealing  coins or cheating on tests of athletic ability.  They found that
106 See id. at 382-83, Tables LXXI and LXXII (“Intercorrelations among deception tests of the
same type” ranged from .462 to .836, while “Average correlations between single tests of different
techniques” ranged from -.003 to .312, with only one average correlation above .3) The authors stated
that, “as we progressively change the situation we progressively lower the correlations between the tests.
. . .  [W]e interpret these facts to mean that the consistency of the individual is a function of the
situation.” Id. at 384. Hartshorne and May concluded that, “[t]he results of these studies show that
neither deceit nor its opposite, ‘honesty,’ are unified character traits, but rather specific functions of life
situations.” Id. at 411.
107 Id. at 22. 
108 Id. at 28.
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correlations between different kinds of dishonest or deceptive behaviors were very
modest.106
Mischel evaluated the accuracy and utility of psychological assessments of
character traits and of psychodynamic states (ego strength, defenses, repression,
dependency, etc.).  Much of his path-breaking book deals with the reliability and validity
of personality tests and clinical assessments.  Clinical assessments did not stand up
well either in terms of interrater reliability or in terms of external measures, such as
progress of the patient.  Pencil-and-paper personality tests and tests such as the
Rorschach test, sentence completion tests, and the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)
did not correlate very highly with each other or with measures of behavior.  His views
about the lack of utility of trait-state theories is tied to his preference for “social
behavioral” therapy, e.g., counter-conditioning and extinction of phobias by small steps
during which the patient becomes desensitized to the object of fear, as opposed to
psychodynamic analysis based upon the belief that a person’s basic personality can be
inferred from cues such as performance on projective tests, Freudian slips, or
interpretation of dreams.  He found that hypotheses about generalized traits often did
not stand up.  For example, he noted that some psychodynamic theorists believe that
reactions toward authority stemming from altitudes towards parental figures would
generalize to attitudes towards superiors in the workplace.  However, experimental
testing indicates that there was no substantial correlation between attitudes toward
fathers and attitudes toward bosses. Similar results were obtained in examining
attitudes towards peers and comparing them to attitudes toward siblings.  Thus, Mischel 
concluded that “there was little evidence for generality of attitudes either toward
authority or toward peers.”107  He also expressed doubt about the generality of the
psychological construct of an “authoritarian personality.” Psychologists had
hypothesized that persons with authoritarian personalities had little tolerance for
ambiguity.  But tests that measure different types of intolerance of ambiguity had little
correlation with each other.108  He noted similar results with the posited personality trait
of “rigidity.”  Similarly, pencil and paper anxiety scales correlated substantially with each
109 Id. at 81.
110 Id. at 101.
111 Id. at 154.
112
 This has been itself a research problem of psychology: what factors enable the prediction of a
person’s adult behavior from his or her behavior as a child? One of the best answers has been
temperament (activity level, emotionality, sociability, impulsivity). See ARNOLD H. BUSS & R. PLOMIN, A
TEMPERAMENT THEORY OF PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1975); Jerome Kagan, Temperamental
Contributions to Social Behavior, 44 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 668 (1989).
113 For further discussion, see infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
114 See Roger Park, Character at the Crossroads, supra note ___ at 737 & n. 57 (1998); LEE
ROSS AND RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
116-17 (1991). 
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other, but not with psychological measures of anxiety.109 He noted generally that when
behaviors are measured by tests with similar formats and content there are substantial
correlations but the correlation often does not hold when the same behaviors are
measured by different means.110 Though much of his book deals with correlations
between psychological tests or between tests and personality ratings by subjects or
their acquaintances, sometimes he also considered studies that involved observed
behavior. For example, he referred to the Hartshorne and May study as one in which
cheating on one test did not have a high correlation with cheating on a different type of
test, and lying in classroom situations showed almost no correlation with deception in
out-of-classroom situations.  He noted that experiments in which childrens’ propensity
to delay gratification was observed indicated that this behavior was also malleable, and
could be influenced by such situational factors as observation by the children of the
behavior of adult confederates whose behavior modeled patience.111
The question for the law of evidence is whether the findings of the studies
reviewed and reported by Hartshorne & May and Mischel – and cited by proponents as
the basis for a strict ban on character evidence – generalize to the situation of greatest
interest to the law of evidence. One can question the relevance of the studies involving
children. To what extent is the moral behavior of children stable enough to think that
what is learned from those studies tells us about the behavior of adults?112 Another way
in which the populations may differ is that most if not all of the psychological research
reviewed involves normal persons, while the accused in a serious criminal case is 
disproportionately likely to be suffering from some kind of abnormality.113  Similarly,
valid research about the predictive value of ordinary behavior does not necessarily
generalize to the prediction of extreme behavior.114
115 For a useful review of these studies, see ROSS & NISBETT, supra note ___ (1991).
116 See WALTER MISCHEL, INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY 480-81 (5th ed. 1993) (“Aggression
is a dimension of behavior on which stable individual differences have been identified beginning in grade
school. These differences remain stable even over long periods of time.”)  See also LEONARD
BERKOWITZ, AGGRESSION: ITS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROL 131 (1993); MICHAEL R.
GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 50 (1990) ("[W]hat is not arguable is
that aggressive behavior, however engendered, once established, remains remarkably stable across time,
situation, and even generations within a family"); Dan Olweus, Stability of Aggressive Reaction Patterns
in Males: A Review, 86 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 852-75 (1979). The famous Milgram experiments, in
which subjects were induced to give seemingly dangerous (but fake) electric shocks to confederates when
told to do so by an authority figure, could be adduced as evidence that criminal aggression is highly
situational, but these experiments are better regarded as testing obedience to authority than as a test of
antisocial aggressiveness. See Michael R. Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, A Control Theory
Interpretation of Psychological Research on Aggression, in AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: SOCIAL
INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVES 47, 53 (Richard B. Felson and James T. Tedeschi eds., 1993). 
(Milgram’s studies “measure compliance, obedience, or...acquiescence," rather than aggression); ROSS &
NISBETT, supra note — at 52-58.
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When the legal issue is whether evidence showing propensity for criminal
violence should be received, there is an additional problem of “fit”: none of the
underlying research in the studies referred to dealt with criminal or violent behavior. 
And though decades of research have carried the Hartshorne & May findings beyond
the lying, cheating, and stealing of schoolchildren to a far wider array of behavior and
situations, and though the studies reviewed by Mischel, and their progeny, similarly
examined a wide array of behavior, it is not clear that they generalize to violent
behavior.  Conclusions about the lack of cross-situational consistency of behavior have
been based on studies that generally examine nonviolent, noncriminal behavior of
normal research participants.115  This is not a criticism of that body of research, but
simply the observation that they do not include the behavior of greatest relevance to the
law, and a caution about generalizing from those findings to the legal question of the
predictive power of character and other-crimes evidence.  Some of the studies do deal
with aggression, a  trait construct that seems somewhat analogous to violent criminal
conduct, but the reported research on that trait gives little comfort to those who believe
that behavior is highly unstable and situation-dependent.116  At the end of the day,
external validity (generalizability) cannot be determined by logic, but only empirically.
Even for the behavior studied, Mischel did not offer extreme claims about the
absence of individual differences or the irrelevance of prior behavior.  He even looked
favorably upon the use of other act evidence for prediction of behavior in certain
situations, considering it superior to clinical psychodynamic assessments based on
constructs such as “infantile dependency needs” or “passive-aggressive character
make-up.”  Indeed, one of the important implications that psychologists took from
Mischel’s findings was that personality measures are weaker predictors than past
behavior is, leading to the aphorism that “the best predictor of future behavior is past
117 Evidence judges are sometimes more willing to let in bad-act evidence to impeach a witness
when it supports an expert psychiatric assessment by a clinician than when it is offered for the naked
inference that because the subject previously engaged in bad-act behavior, he is likely to do so again. The
expert testimony can be viewed as being about an illness or medical condition, whereas naked bad-act
evidence is likely to be viewed as forbidden evidence of character. See, e.g., United States v. Lindstrom,
698 F.2d 1154, ___ n. 6 (11th Cir. 1983). 
118 See JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985).
119 James Dabbs, Testosterone Measurements in Social and Clinical Psychology, 11 J. SOC. &
CLIN. PSYCHOL. 302 (1992); J.M. Dabbs, T.S. Carr, R.L. Frady, J.K. Riad, Testosterone, Crime, and
Misbehavior Among 692 Male Prison Inmates, 18 PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 627
(1995).
120 J. Archer, The Influence of Testosterone on Human Aggression, 82 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 1
(1991); James Dabbs & R. Morris, Testosterone, Social Class, and Antisocial Behavior in a Sample of
4,462 Men, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 209 (1990).
121 See, e.g., G.R. Patterson, R.A. Littman & W. Bricker, Assertive Behavior in Children: A Step
Toward a Theory of Aggression, 32 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY OF RESEARCH IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 5 (1967); J.F. McCarthy & B.R. Kelly, Aggression, Performance Variables, and Anger
Self-report in Ice Hockey Players, 99 J. PSYCHOL. 97 (1978); J.F. McCarthy & B.R. Kelly, Aggressive
Behavior and its Effect on Performance over Time in Ice Hockey Athletes: An Archival Study, 9 INT’L J.
SPORT PYSCHOL. 90 (1978).
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behavior.” By focusing on the behavior, as a matter of sheer prediction, it does not
matter whether the causes are internal biological or personality factors that we have not
yet discovered and measured or whether the causes are external situational ones (and
the behavior recurs because similar situations are repeatedly encountered).  In this
respect, one might find in Michel a trace of support for admission of bad-act evidence
that evidence judges would see as character evidence, and for exclusion of expert
clinical assessments that judges might see as falling outside the character ban.117
What about the findings of research that has focused on individual differences in
and predictors of violence and aggression? Some of that research suggests more
useful explanatory and predictive factors. For example, the effects of age and gender
are well recognized, with a greatly disproportionate amount of violent crime committed
by males between 18-21.118  Among prisoners who had been convicted of unprovoked
violent acts (as compared to prisoners convicted of nonviolent crimes) the former had
higher levels of testosterone,119 and among non-prison populations, boys and men with
higher testosterone levels were more likely to respond aggressively to provocation.120
When aggression has been rewarded, especially intermittently, it tends to persist.121
Some men have long records of criminal violence, which has been found to serve one
of two major purposes: violence used to command respect among associates and
122 HANS TOCH, VIOLENT MEN (1980).
123 WILSON & HERNNSTEIN, supra note ___. For researchers, the debate over these findings
focuses on whether they reflect biological differences (inherited or otherwise) or whether they are
differences in how these closely related individuals were raised in their families of origin. Leon Kamin,
Is Crime in the Genes?, SCI. AM. 22 (January, 1986); Heathcote W. Wales, Tilting at Crime: The Perils
of Eclecticism, 74 GEO. L. J. 481 (1985). The day may be drawing near when extensions of the human
genome project will allow far more precise predictions of at least some kinds and causes of violent
behavior. See, e.g., Dan Rather, Criminal Genes, 60 Minutes, 1999 WL 16209084 (program concerning
Jeff Landrigan, an Arizona death row prisoner with an extensive criminal record matching that of his
biological father, Darrell Hill, on death row in Arkansas, though the son was adopted out of his
biological family in infancy). For the issue of the admissibility of past acts, the cause of the behavior
matters little; the persistence of the behavior is the relevant finding. 
124 John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, § 9-2.3, in MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H.
KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, eds., 2002) (“[T]he sober conclusion that clinicians are
‘modestly better than chance’ at predicting violence appears to be becoming the consensus view.”).
125 JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MCARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL
DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001).
126 Monahan, supra note __, § 9-2.1.1.
127 Id., § 9-2.2.2.
128 Id., § 9-2.1.1.
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violence used for more instrumental purposes.122 A review of a large body of research
on people who participate in violent and other criminal activity found that such conduct
clusters among genetically closely related individuals.123
The most voluminous work, which has focused squarely on the question of the
predictability of violence, has been in the area of mental illness and violence. 
Consistent with the findings of Mischel and others, clinicians using psychiatric theories
and diagnoses long have had difficulty predicting who among the mentally ill will commit
acts of violence and who will not.124 That persistent finding has been helpful in leading
researchers away from reliance on clinical assessment to study specific risk factors125
and to apply those risk factors actuarially. This has increased the power of violence
prediction. Mental disorder itself is “a risk factor of modest magnitude for the
occurrence of violence.”126  The factors most useful for predicting the violence
proneness of the mentally disordered are the same as those useful for predicting in the
general offender population, namely: criminal history, antisocial personality, substance
abuse, and family dysfunction.127 Prediction tools using the risk factor approach have
greatly improved predictive power, though it remains less than a precise art/science.128
129 See MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note __.
130 Though we say this with some trepidation, a Bayesian format for presenting the information
might be most appropriate. 
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The occurrence of past violent acts are predictive; the more of them and the more
serious they are, the higher the predictive accuracy.129
 Ultimately, what the law needs to know is whether reform will increase the
accuracy of factfinder conclusions.  The possible reforms run from exclusionary
proposals (barring character and other acts evidence) or the more inclusive proposals
(making character evidence in some form, as well as other acts evidence, more
available). In order to reach such conclusions, the law must learn more about the actual
utility of “character” and prior acts in predicting behavior (else it must guess), as well as
about how factfinders will process those kinds of information. The research referred to
is clearly relevant to those tasks, but also insufficient.
What we have seen so far is that clinical opinions about personality traits may be
less useful than practitioners believe as a predictor of future behavior, but that past
behavior might be more useful, especially if the violent behavior has been recurrent, if
the situation settings for the behavior at issue were similar, and if factfinders can be
given realistic, informative, data-based cautions about the predictive power of the
evidence.130 It is by no means out of the question that a high comparative propensity to
engage in violent behavior could have great value, when used in conjunction with
incident-specific evidence, in post-dicting whether a person committed a single act of
that type of behavior on a particular occasion. 
The larger point we have tried to make is not about whether the body of
psychological research points toward an expansion or a contraction of the prohibition on
character evidence. The larger point is about generalizing and distinguishing studies,
about making fair and informed use of studies, and about trying to reach a correct
answer to evidence policy questions. In using social science literature, legal scholars
should not lose the standards that they would apply in creating first-rate doctrinal
scholarship.  First-rate doctrinal scholarship is not advocacy scholarship; the authors do
not snatch quotations from cases on their side and ignore cases on the other side. 
They are expected to squarely confront authority on the other side and to argue why it
is inapposite or wrongly decided, if they conclude that it is.  Secondly, doctrinal scholars
are expected to read the authorities that they rely upon with care and determine
whether they are applicable or distinguishable. They should do no less when using the
psychology authority. 
3.  Empirical Research on the  Hearsay Rule
131
 Stephan Landsman & Richard Rakos, A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the
Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 65 (1991). 
132
 For a bibliography, see See Roger C. Park, Visions of Applying the Scientific Method to the
Hearsay Rule, 2003 Mich. St. DCL L. Rev. 1149, 1171-74 (2003).  
133 In addition to arguing appellate cases involving high tech forensic science, he was co-counsel
for O.J. Simpson in State v. Simpson. 
134 This reveals a major advantage to simulation studies in this context. In actual trials, rarely can
one know what the true underlying facts were. Some of the studies were ingenious enough to begin by
having the “hearsay witnesses” observe a videotaped event (the underlying reality that would be at issue)
and then be videotaped being interviewed about what they had seen. Those interviews became the “in
court” hearsay testimony heard by the mock jurors. The results of such studies can provide insights into
the ability of mock jurors to reach accurate conclusions about the underlying events which are otherwise
completely unavailable.
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The first empirical study of the juror use of hearsay published in 1991. 131 Since
then there have been at least 26 other studies, most of them original empirical work as
opposed to reviews or commentary on empirical work by others.132 Unlike the
eyewitness studies, the hearsay studies often involve collaboration between law
professors and psychologists.  Fourteen of theses studies were co-authored by law
professors, one by a lawyer, and three by William C. Thompson, a psychology
professor who has a law degree and who probably spends more time in court than most
law professors who teach evidence.133 These close collaborations are entirely
understandable. For hearsay research, lawyers and psychologists need each other.
The legal setting of eyewitness identification problems is easy for someone with no
formal law training to understand.  But the legal context in which hearsay issues arise,
the rationales of the hearsay rule, and the situations in which out-of-court statements
would be admissible in a real trial are things that can be understood only by someone
who has carefully studied the concepts.
In essence, what these studies do is to present some mock jurors with the “live”
testimony of a witness with personal knowledge and other mock jurors with the same
information from a hearsay witness. The research question asked by most of these
studies is whether the jurors discount the evidence they acquired through hearsay,
reflecting their recognition of its weaknesses compared with the firsthand witness. A few
studies have been clever enough to ask whether the jurors are able to make proper use
of the hearsay evidence in order to move closer to an accurate conclusion about the
underlying events. For example, if the out of court declarant’s statements were made
under the influence of suggestive questioning, does that troublesome fact come through
to the jurors as well by way of a hearsay witness as it does by examination of the
firsthand witness? Some studies created mock cases, the “truth” of which is not only not
known but does not exist; others created a set of true underlying facts, and the jurors’
conclusions about the event could be compared to its reality.134 Some of the studies
135 There is one criticism of the hearsay experiments that is entirely without merit. Professor
Michael Seigel argues that all hearsay experiments in which the trial stimuli were videotaped fail to test
any difference between hearsay and non-hearsay conditions. Professor Seigel writes that, “[A]lthough
each of the studies purports to examine the ability of human subjects to differentiate and discount
hearsay in comparison with witness testimony, they actually measure individuals' abilities to differentiate
among different types of hearsay and hearsay within hearsay. Remarkably, the articles are silent on this
critical issue concerning their internal design.” Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern
Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1042-43 (1994). As applied to videotaped simulations,
this criticism is conceptually barren.  The hearsay rule is actually two rules: the important and
consequential rule that a witness cannot report another person’s statement if it is used for its truth, and
the relatively trivial rule that witnesses testifying to firsthand observations cannot testify by videotape. 
Because these two rules both share the label “hearsay” instead of being called the “secondhand
information rule” and the “videotape rule,” Professor Seigel believes that a trial presented by videotape
cannot tell us anything about the processing of secondhand information.  He gives no reason for this
other than the labels. To be sure, videotaped trials are not real trials, but this challenge to validity is no
more serious in the hearsay context than in any other context using videotaped stimuli, such as studies of
the effects of  jury instructions. 
136 It is far from clear how necessary a realistic simulation is to getting correct answers that are
generalizable to actual trial settings. A comparison of simulations with more and with less verisimilitude
found that the results reached did not differ. Brian Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury
Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out? 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999). But it almost certainly is the case
that lawyers and judges are more persuaded by studies which share many superficial similarities with
trial procedures.
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presented the “case” by way of brief written transcripts or even briefer summaries,
others by audio or videotaped presentations of a mock trials.135 In some studies the
hearsay witness was a layperson, in others an expert witness. In some the firsthand
witness was cross-examined and in others not. And so on.
Put succinctly, some of these studies appear to offer greater verisimilitude than
others.136 And, perhaps more important, the studies asked different research questions,
thereby having more (or less) relevance to the legal policy questions about hearsay that
need to be asked and answered. The results, however, cannot be put succinctly. The
circumstances of some studies revealed jurors to be quite capable of heavily
discounting hearsay testimony as compared to firsthand witness testimony. In other
studies the jurors credited the hearsay as much as they did the firsthand testimony. It is
not always clear what the right or ideal response should be to the hearsay testimony, in
contrast to the testimony of the firsthand witness.
Whatever their methods and findings, these studies are an important start, but
certainly no more than a start, in a complex area of evidence law and policy. Reflecting
on how they relate to evidence policy, and especially on where they cast light or fall
short of casting light, should guide more and better studies in the future. Our reflections,
below, are organized in terms of three important issues of hearsay policy. 
137 The substitution has other consequences, such as precluding physical confrontation between
the witness and the accused in criminal cases, allowing evidence to be received from out-of-court
declarants who were not under oath or subject to observation for demeanor cues.  
138 See Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park, & Steven D. Penrod,  Jurors’ Perceptions of
Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN L. REV. 703 (1992) and  Maithillee K. Pathak & William C.
Thompson, From Child to Witness to Jury: Effects of Suggestion on the Transmission and Evaluation of
Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW 1 (1999).
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a. Whether Hearsay Should be Received When
There Is a Choice Between Hearsay and Live Testimony
This first issue of hearsay policy arises when a live firsthand witness is available,
but a party would like to offer a hearsay witness instead. The policy-maker must ask
whether harm is done by allowing adversaries to substitute hearsay for available live
testimony.  Most jurists would agree that the principal harm would be the loss of cross-
examination.137 It is risky to allow adversaries to substitute hearsay evidence for cross-
examined evidence.  They will substitute hearsay for live testimony when the
substitution helps their case. An advocate would choose to forgo the benefits of a vivid
live presentation when the advocate does not want to have her witness questioned by
the opponent, which is exactly the situation in which cross-examination might turn up
information helpful in finding the truth. 
The existing empirical studies of hearsay simply do not address this issue. They
do not try to study whether adversaries would choose to present inferior evidence in the
absence of a hearsay rule, and they do not attempt to examine the value of cross-
examination in uncovering new evidence. The experiments focus on the modality of
presentation of the evidence, not on whether the trial procedure of cross-examination
uncovers useful new information. What the studies test is the impact of the medium,
just as in an experiment comparing the effects of live testimony with the effects of
closed-circuit TV testimony. There is no attempt to determine whether cross-
examination might bring out new facts or reveal collateral facts bearing on the credibility
of the witness. 
That is not so much a flaw in the studies as it is a limitation on the inferences
that can be drawn from them. The hearsay studies that seek to say something about
the accuracy of hearsay, as opposed to its impact, do not seek to simulate any kind of
cross-examination, much less typical cross-examination.138  Thus it is obvious that they
are of limited usefulness in assessing the value of hearsay testimony as a substitute for
cross-examined testimony.  
139 See United States  v. Day, 491 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Roger C. Park, Trial Objections
Handbook § 4:6 (2d Ed. 2001).  The increasing   popularity of the concept that a defendant forfeits his
hearsay/confrontation objection by silencing the victim could, however, someday lead to free admission
of victim statements, at least in cases in which there is enough evidence of homicide to allow the trial
judge to find that the prosecution has laid the foundation for forfeiture by showing that the defendant
killed the victim. See People v. Giles, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 843 (Ca. App. 2004); State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609,
88 P.3d 789 (2004) (holding that defendant forfeited the right to confrontation by murdering victim,
citing Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpah, 31 Israel  L.Rev. 506 (1997)).
140
 Kovera et al., supra note __; Pathak and Thompson, supra note __.
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b. Whether Hearsay Should be Received When There is No Choice
A different issue of hearsay policy is presented when the declarant is not
available, so that hearsay testimony is the only way of learning her account of the facts.
Here, there is a strong common-sense argument that hearsay is better than nothing at
all, that one need not go in the dark because the light is not perfect.  But the hearsay
rule sometimes bars such testimony.139 The empirical question is whether hearsay
evidence is so misleading that it ought to be excluded even when live testimony is not
an alternative.  Here, empirical studies can be helpful even if they do not simulate
adversarial incentives to substitute hearsay for live testimony. Nonetheless, it is difficult
to use the existing experiments to reach conclusions about this issue. 
The legal policy issue is whether hearsay would be helpful to the jury in reaching
the ground truth. In most of the experiments, the ground truth was not known to the
experimenter, as we noted above. In two of the experiments,140 the investigators did
have accurate knowledge of the ground truth. They controlled and recorded the events
witnessed by the hearsay declarant and by the person reporting the content of the
hearsay statements, and examined the question whether the juror subjects were able to
use the secondhand information to accurately reconstruct what actually happened.    
Neither of those experiments simulated cross-examination. Here it is necessary
to distinguish between cross-examination of the declarant  and cross-examination of
the in-court hearsay witness. If the declarant is not available for cross-examination, the
legal policy issue does not turn on whether it would be better to hear from a cross-
examined declarant or from a hearsay witness, because cross-examining the declarant
is not an option.  But an experiment would cast clearer light on the legal situation if it
involved cross-examination of the hearsay witness.  The cross-examiner could ask
questions that might undermine the believability of the hearsay witness.  At a minimum,
these questions make it more apparent to the jurors that the hearsay witness did not
see the event, does not know from firsthand knowledge what happened, is relying
solely on the declarant, and does not know the witnessing conditions of the declarant
(such as whether something was in the way, whether the declarant was paying
attention, etc.).    
141 See, e.g., ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2002) at § 12:2.
142 It might have been due to a difference in the medium by which the trial evidence was
presented (written versus audio or videotaped); it might have been a difference in whether the hearsay
witnesses were especially credible individuals (e.g., expert witnesses); it might have been due to
something else. In some studies, the mode of presentation might have made it particularly hard for jurors
to realize they were dealing with hearsay, a problem that is much less likely to occur in a trial. 
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c. Whether Erroneous Admission of Hearsay
Should be Deemed Prejudicial Error
Appellate courts often confront the question whether erroneous admission or
exclusion of hearsay is prejudicial error.  When an evidence error is harmless in the
sense that it was quite unlikely to have affected the result, then appellate courts refuse
to reverse.141  The hearsay studies have relevance to this policy issue even when they
do not address the question whether hearsay aids in reaching accurate verdicts. If, as
some of the studies suggest, juries heavily discount hearsay, then the erroneous
admission of hearsay (at least where it is substituted for live testimony) should less
often be considered to be prejudicial error.  
The hearsay experiments reach divergent results, and without further research
we cannot be sure why.142  Based on the features of the extant studies, the reason
might be a difference in the medium by which the trial evidence was presented (written
versus audio or videotaped). Or it might have been a difference in whether or not the
hearsay witnesses were especially credible individuals (e.g., expert witnesses). In some
studies, the mode of presentation may have made it particularly hard for jurors to
realize they were dealing with hearsay, a problem that is much less likely to occur in a
trial. Another possibility has to do with who the out-of-court declarant was. Substituting
hearsay adults for child declarants may be more acceptable to the mock jurors than
other hearsay because they could readily sympathize with the possible need for it.
Because there are many different situations in which hearsay can be offered, and
different witnesses through whom it can be offered – parties, police, informants,
children, experts, to name a few – it is hard to generalize. Or it might have been due to
something else.
Because of divergent results, the wide range of circumstances in which hearsay
issues can arise, and differences between the simulations and the actual courtroom
environment, caution must be used in deriving broad policy recommendations from the
experiments on hearsay impact.  
Despite the reservations noted above concerning those three basic hearsay
policy issues, the experiments are a good start in answering more narrow questions.
143 Amye R. Warren and Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: How Well Do
Interviewers Recall Their Interviews With Children?, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL. AND L. 355 (1999).
144 Pathak and Thompson, supra note ___.
145 Suppose, for example, that the lawyer plans to cross-examine a lying police officer by getting
the police officer committed to the story that the officer had not used the N word in the previous ten
years, a story that the cross-examiner knows can be definitively disproved. A study that shows you don’t
lose anything when you use hearsay instead of a neutral witness would not mean that you do not lose
anything when you use hearsay in lieu of cross-examining Detective Fuhrman.
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For example, the experiment by Warren & Woodhall143 suggests a danger of hearsay in
the child witness context – that persons interrogating child witnesses do not accurately
remember the mode of interrogation, and how suggestive they were or not – while the
Pathak and Thomson experiment144 indicates that when the suggestive interrogation
causes a complete change of story, the trier of fact may be able to detect the truth even
without realizing the full danger of suggestiveness.  Other experiments may be useful to
lawyers making strategic decisions, such as whether to substitute a hearsay witness for
a child witness.  And, as has been the case with studies of eyewitness testimony, the
studies are more likely to be useful as they multiply and converge.  Studies examining
particular hearsay dangers – for example, the danger of suggestive questioning of child
witnesses – in particular situations are likely to be more useful than studies that attempt
to answer the global question of whether hearsay is good evidence. 
But the studies that are available now are just a start.  The hearsay problem is
complex because there are so many different situations.  A study that tests whether
jurors (or judges, for that matter) are successful in using hearsay evidence of
eyewitness identification will not necessarily tell you anything about whether they would
be successful in using hearsay accounts of medical diagnosis or hearsay accounts of
declarations by child witnesses.  And the purposes of cross-examination can be
different in different situations, hence the use of hearsay will differ as an adequate
substitute for cross.  Hearsay might be an adequate substitute in situations in which the
purpose of cross is to show defects in perception, but not where the purpose is to show
deception.  A hearsay experiment that shows jurors successfully using hearsay from a
neutral declarant would not show that the jurors could detect a lying declarant through
the medium of a hearsay witness.145
Consequently, it makes sense to approach the vast problem of hearsay and its
exceptions bit by bit, studying a specific situation such as child witnesses and specific
dangers such as insensitivity to suggestiveness. To get a good grip on it, there probably
will need to be hundreds of studies, as in the eyewitness area. Until then, policy-makers
seeking answers to questions such as whether the hearsay rule should be abolished or
modified in a particular class of situations will have to continue to rely upon their
traditional tools of history, experience, and fireside induction, with occasional help from
the empirical research that is available.
146 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
147 A search of the Westlaw JLR database (journals and law reviews) on July 26, 2005, found
1,253 articles citing Kumho Tire v. Carmichael and 4,918 articles citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.
148 See, DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2nd ed. 2002; Supp. 2003);
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 2000).
149 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
150 Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with
Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 1069 (1998).
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II. Law and Forensic Science
Law and forensic science has long been a topic of evidence scholarship – there
have always been articles about new ways of gathering evidence to prove the identity of
suspected perpetrators. But the flourishing of this field has been remarkable since the
Supreme Court’s Daubert decision in 1993.146 Daubert’s command to judges to do their
own screening for scientific validity rather than merely deferring to self declared experts
has encouraged scholarship about whether expertise has been scientifically tested,
what the results of testing have been, and how well judges have been doing with the
law and the science.
Daubert has already led to an astonishing amount of scholarship147 and has
created a legal environment that will lead to even more scholarly (as well as judicial)
discussion of issues concerning the scientific validity of scientific claims and forensic
techniques. It quickly gave birth to new treatises, seeking to look at the world of
scientific evidence through the framework of Daubert.148 These discussions focus not
only on issues of the legal admissibility of scientific evidence, or other limitations that
might be placed on it, but Daubert and Kumho Tire149 require inquiry into the scientific
basis for the evidence. In the post-Daubert world, judges, lawyers, and legal scholars
cannot do their work properly without becoming scientifically literate. 
What lawyers, scholars, and the courts are finding is that some kinds of
evidence, most notably some of the forensic sciences, which had been all but
unquestioned under older admissibility tests, appeared to have startling weaknesses
when viewed through the lens of the new test.150 What courts should do with this new
151 For discussion of specific scientific topics, see the various chapters of Faigman et al., supra
note __.
152 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA
Profiling, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 13 (2001).
153 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the Law
About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361 (1991).
154 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, ___ SCIENCE ___ (forthcoming).
155 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
156 See Faigman et al., supra note __, Fingerprint Identification, § 27 (2002; Supp 2003); SIMON
COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES (2001); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint
“Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002).
157 See FAIGMAN et al., supra note __, Fingerprint Identification: Post-Daubert Challenges in
Federal Courts, § 27-1.2 (Supp., 2003).
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realization, what the exact requirements of Daubert are, and what the contours of
Daubert’s exclusionary zone are or should be are the subjects of countless articles.151
Another important development in the area has been the rise and success of
DNA evidence.  At first DNA evidence was accepted blindly, like many other forensic
sciences; then came the Castro case – real scientists got involved and criticized the
methodology of the DNA labs, successfully.152 Then the issues of methodology and fit
were addressed and cleaned up. It now appears that DNA may, by example, provide
benefits to the rest of forensic science, because its more careful and explicit scientific
approach puts to shame so much of what had previously been accepted as forensic
expertise.153  And exoneration by DNA may also help throw light on the flaws of other
forensic science, just as it has already reinforced, in the eyes of policy makers, the
scientific knowledge about the fallibility of eyewitness identification.154
There already have been successful challenges to a form of expertise that, for
most of the 20th Century, had been regarded as being of settled admissibility –
handwriting identification.155 Even the holy grail of forensic science, fingerprinting, has
been challenged. We are not referring to rolled prints used to prove that a person once
arrested in Phoenix is the same person who is now on trial in San Francisco, but rather
the methods used in comparing latent prints, lifted from crime scenes, with rolled prints.
The scientific basis for the claim that identification by latent prints is infallible if
established procedures are followed just does not exist.156 Most federal courts which
have confronted this realization responded to it by manipulating the law to permit
admission.157 One federal judge initially responded by limiting admission (excluding the
158 United States v. Llera-Plaza, 2002 WL 27305 (E.D.Pa.); see also, United States v. Crisp, 324
F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting) (explicating the shortcomings of fingerprint and
handwriting expert evidence). 
159 United States v. Llera-Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549 (2002) (finding, nevertheless, that the
“science” of fingerprint identification suffered from major shortcomings).
160 See, e.g., Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie?, NEW YORKER (May 27, 2002), at 96. That
article predicts, accurately we think, that the issue is not going to go away. 
161 Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66
B.U.L.REV. 439 (1986)) (“Evidence is being transformed from a field concerned with the articulation of
rules to a field concerned with the process of proof. Wigmore’s other great work [THE SCIENCE OF
JUDICIAL PROOF, cited infra n. __] is being rediscovered, and disciplines outside the law, like
mathematics, psychology and philosophy are being plumbed for the guidance they can give.”)
162 John H. Wigmore, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY AND
GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS, (3d Ed. 1937).
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fingerprint expert’s conclusion of identity, but allowing testimony concerning the
similarities and differences between the latent and known prints),158 but later reversed
himself and went the way of other courts.159 The issue has even begun to interest the
general public.160
Of course, classifications are always disputable, and some might argue that the
field of “law and forensic science ” is really too small if it embraces only the traditional
forensic sciences, and that a better title would be “law and the scientific method,”
because people who write in this field also write about other Daubert topics, such as the
admissibility of epidemiological evidence, psychological syndrome evidence, and so on.
Certainly the scientization of law, and of society in general, with or without Daubert, will
inevitably lead to more evidence scholarship about law and science of all kinds.
III.  The “New Evidence Scholarship” – Probability and Proof
  The term  “New Evidence Scholarship,” coined by Richard Lempert,161 is broad
enough to could cover all interdisciplinary scholarship or even all innovative scholarship.
But the term has most often been applied to scholarship on probability and proof,
including evidence scholarship that applies formal tools of probability theory, such as
Bayes’ theorem. 
 Formal analysis of legal evidence is not a wholly new idea. Wigmore’s Science
of Judicial Proof used symbols and charts as part of a system of evidence analysis.162
And there is a long, if intermittent, history of interest in legal uses of statistics and basic
probability theory: in the Howland Will case in the 1860s, for example, an eminent
163 See The Howland Will Case, 4 AM. L. REV. 625 (1870) (testimony of Charles Pierce). Other
early work included the rigorous and largely ignored efforts of Michael & Adler to trace the logic of
proof, see Jerome Michael  & Mortimer J. Adler,  The Trial of an Issue of Fact: I, 34 COLUM. L. REV.
1224 (1934);  Jerome Michael  & Mortimer J. Adler,  The Trial of an Issue of Fact: II, 34 Colum. L. Rev.
1462 (1934); Jerome Michael  & Mortimer J. Adler,  Real Proof: I, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 344 (1952). William
Twining detected a “continuous intellectual tradition from Bentham, through Wills, Best, Stephen,
Thayer, Gulson, Wigmore, Michael and Adler to Leo Leven, Irvin Rutter, and contemporary teachers of
law . . . .”  See William Twining, Taking Facts Seriously, in William Twining, RETHINKING EVIDENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 15 (1990; reprint of 1982 essay). Nonetheless, Twining recognized that by the
1970s the field of rigorous analysis of facts seemed “rather neglected” and that there was almost no
mention of topics such as epistemology and probability theory in the standard texts on the law of
evidence.  See William Twining, Rethinking Evidence, in RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS
341-42 (1990).
164 John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968).
165
 L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE  6 (1977)
166 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
167 Michael Finkelstein & William Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). 
168 See William Twining, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS passim and 12-31,
341-72 (1990).
169 Professor Tillers was the chair (with Eric Green), moderator and a panelist at the  Boston
University School of Law Symposium on Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, April 4-6,
1986 and the organizer, chair and a panelist at the Cardozo Conference on Decision and Inference in
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scholar used the product rule in an attempt to calculate whether commonalities in two
signatures could have been coincidental.163
But the word “new” is a fair one, at least in terms of the volume of scholarship. 
Among the seminal works we can count John Kaplan’s 1969 article on decision
theory,164 Richard Eggleston’s 1978 book entitled, Evidence, Proof and Probability, and
Jonathan Cohen’s 1977 challenge to the applicability of standard probability reasoning
in legal contexts.165  The 1968 case of People v. Collins,166 in which the prosecution
misused evidence of probabilities in an ingenious fashion, stirred  up interest in how
probabilities might properly be used in trials.  The celebrated debate in the Harvard Law
Review,167  with Finkelstein and Fairley on one side and Tribe on the other, no doubt
inspired other scholars to pursue the topic, even though Tribe’s  skepticism toward the
practicality of using Bayesian approaches at trial may have also had a dampening
effect.  William  Twining’s calls to action no doubt also helped,168 as did conferences on
new evidence scholarship  organized by Peter Tillers.169  David Schum, a nonlawyer,
Litigation, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, March 24-26, 1991. Email I from Peter Tillers to
Roger Park, July 8, 2005. When contacted,  Professor Tillers also noted the influence of activities such as
William Twining’s 1982 conference on "Facts in Law" at Durham University and the honors seminars
organized by Adrian Zuckerman at Oxford that started in 1984. Email II from Peter Tillers to Roger Park,
July 8, 2005.  For a European perspective on the development of the field, see William Twining, 
RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS passim and 349-50 (1990).
170 See Peter Tillers, Web of Things in the Mind: A New Science of Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1225 (1989) (review of David Schum’s EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
(1987), with comments on his contributions to the science of evidence).
171 See JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (describing anomalies that
arise if Pascalian probability theory is applied in certain legal situations, and arguing that a “Baconian”
approach would be more just).
172 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1508-10 (1999).  Judge Posner also argues that, even if other evidence cannot be obtained,
the cost of trying such marginal cases outweighs the benefits.  Id. at 1510. For further discussion of the
general topic of “naked statistical evidence,” see Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the
Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV.L.REV. 530, 533-36 (1989);  Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of
Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A Clarification of the "Naked Statistical Evidence" Debate, The
Meaning of "Evidence," and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable  Doubt,  65 TUL.L. REV.
1093 (1991); Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 TUL. L. REV.
457 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, A Response to Professor Allen, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1111 (1991); Daniel 
Shaviro, A Response to Professor Callen, 65 TUL. L. REV. 499 (1991).
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also deserves much credit for interesting law professors in formal analysis of
evidence.170
One “new evidence” topic revolves around the question whether standard
probability logic is or ought to be consistent with judicial fact-finding.  Sometimes naked
statistical evidence seems intuitively insufficient to justify a judgment.  If the only proof
that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s bus instead of another company’s bus
was mere evidence that a majority of the blue busses in town belonged to the
defendant, many of us would hesitate to find that identification sufficient.  Or if the
defendant was chosen at random from a crowd in a rodeo, and was sued on a claim
that he had not paid for his ticket, we would hesitate to issue judgment based merely on
proof that only 499 tickets had been sold and there were a thousand spectators, so that
defendant, chosen at random, had just over a 50% chance of being a gatecrasher. 
Does the fact that our intuition makes us cringe from issuing judgment on these facts
alone mean that the standard logic of probability does not or should not apply to
trials?171  Scholars who are comfortable with using standard probability logic have
provided many answers to the paradox, including the argument that if that is all the
plaintiff chooses to present then we cannot be sure that the probability is actually over
50%, because a negative inference can be drawn from lack of other proof.172
173
 Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401 (1986)
174 See Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical Interpretation
of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 947 (1986).
175 See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory 87 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1575-80 (2001).  For another discussion, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1512-15 (1999). 
176 For a useful introduction, see David McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined
on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 WASH. & LEE  L.REV.
741 (1990). 
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The conjunction problem raises similar questions. Standard instructions tell
jurors that if they find each element to be true by a preponderance of the evidence, they
should find for the plaintiff.  The problem is that proving each element to be more
probable than not does not prove that the conjunction of all elements is more probable
than not. If we make the assumption that the elements are independent of each other,
this instruction is technically inaccurate because if there are two elements and the
probability of each of them being true is 60%, then the probability of both being true is
.6 x .6, or 36%.  Does that mean that the standard logic of probability is inapposite, and
that we therefore must think of legal reasoning as proceeding from some other basis? 
The conjunction problem is one reason why Professor Allen has proposed
reconceptualization of civil trials in a way that tells juries to decide whose story is most
believable, as opposed to telling them to decide whether plaintiff has established each
element by a preponderance of the evidence.173 Again, there are answers, including the
answer that jury instructions are often ambiguous on the question whether it is sufficient
merely to prove each element by a preponderance, and that instructions sometimes
suggest  that the joint occurrence of all elements must be proven.174 Moreover, the 
approach of telling juries to judge relative plausibility of the parties’ stories would lead to 
its own anomalies. Suppose, for example, the defendant tells one story, the plaintiff tells
a slightly more plausible story, and the jury believes that a third story not offered by
either party (but favoring the defendant) is the true one.175
Another topic, the use of Bayes’ Theorem to evaluate evidence and evidence
law, has become one of the centerpieces of the new evidence scholarship.176  Bayes'
Theorem is a basic tenet  of probability theory that can be used to adjust a probability
assessment upon receiving new evidence.  For example, imagine a case in which the
issue is whether the defendant is the source of a hair found at a crime scene.  After
hearing testimony of lay witnesses, the fact-finder forms an opinion that the odds are 2
to 1 that the defendant is the source of the hair. In addition, there is expert testimony
that mitochondrial DNA sequencing shows that the hair has a genetic profile that has a
population frequency of 1%.  The defendant’s hair matches that profile. Bayes' theorem
would provide a way of updating the prior estimate of 2 to 1 odds with the new
information of the match.
177 For purposes of the example, we are ignoring the possibility that someone not living in the
vicinity is the source.
178 This assumption is not logically compelled. It would not be valid, for example, if  laboratory
error were taken into account, or if hairs from the same person could have different mt-DNA profiles.
But here we assume that we would find a match every time if the hair came from the defendant.
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In the above example, the probability of this test result, given a defendant who is
not the source of the hair, is 1 in 100. (The random match probability in the population.)
That does not mean that there is a 1 in 100 probability that the defendant is the source,
given the mt-DNA test results. The error of confusing these two probabilities is know as
“transposing the conditional.” 
The following example illustrates the error of transposing the conditional.   The 
probability that a person has committed a crime, given that he is in prison Pr(C|P) is
obviously not the same as the probability that a person is in prison, given that he has
committed a crime Pr(P|C). The latter probability is much lower, considering that not all
criminals are caught and that not all crimes are punished with incarceration. To believe
that Pr(C|P) must be equal to Pr(P|C) is the error of transposing the conditional. 
Another way to understand the error of transposing the conditional is to suppose  
that there is absolutely no evidence against the defendant except the mt-DNA test on
the hair.  Suppose  there are 100,000 other people  living in the vicinity and no reason
except the mt-DNA finding to point a finger at the defendant instead of one of the
others. Suppose also that the defendant’s genetic profile matches and the probability of
a random match is 1%. The probability of a match, given that the defendant is not the
source, is 1%. That does not mean that the probability the defendant is not the source,
given that there is a match, is only 1%.  One would expect, out of the 100,000 other
possible suspects, that 1,000 of them would also match. If so, the probability that the
defendant is not the source, given a match, is closer to 99.9% than to 1%.177  Of course,
the probability that defendant is the source would increase dramatically once other
inculpatory evidence is offered, such as testimony that the defendant had a motive and
was seen near the crime scene. 
A fact-finder who used Bayes’ theorem to take account of the mt-DNA test could
arrive at a probability that the defendant is the source without falling into transposition
error.  Suppose again that the fact-finder estimates the prior odds that the defendant
was the source (before the DNA test) to be 2 to 1.  That fact-finder could multiply the
prior odds by a statistic called the “likelihood ratio” to obtain the posterior odds (the
revised estimate of the odds the defendant was the source, after taking the mt-DNA 
test into account). The likelihood ratio is derived by dividing the probability of finding the
evidence of a match, given that the defendant is the source, by the probability of finding
it, given that the defendant is not the source.  Assume that  the probability of finding a
match, given that the defendant is the source, is 100%.178 If the defendant is not the
179 These assumptions require that we ignore the danger of laboratory error.  Putting the danger
of lab error aside is controversial among scholars, even in the usual case in which frequency evidence is
presented without any Bayesian interpretation.  The fact-finder may be prejudiced when an extremely
small match probability is presented without incorporating (or even estimating) the danger that a match
might occur through lab error. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to consider one thing at a time
(first what the evidence shows assuming no lab error, then the danger of lab error in the specific case).
Compare Jonathan J. Koehler, Audrey Chia, and Samuel Lindsey, The Random Match Probability in
DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial? 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201 (1995) and  Jonathan J. Koehler, Why
DNA Likelihood Ratios Should Account for Error (Even When a National Research Council Report Says
They Should Not), 37 J URIMETRICS J. 425 (1997) with Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen
Through the Lens of Science and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (1997), and  Edward J. 
Imwinkelried  & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV.
413, 460-64 (2001). 
180
 Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note __. 
181 Tribe pointed out that to some jurors a probability of .50 might stand for what the chances
were before any evidence was introduced, while to others it might mean that the search has to be
narrowed to two suspects. Tribe, supra note __, at 1358-59.
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source, the probability of finding a match is 1/100 or 1% (the probability of a random
match in the general population).179  The likelihood ratio therefore is 100% divided by
1%, or 100.  To calculate the posterior odds, one would  multiply the prior odds of 2 to 1
by the likelihood ratio of 100.  Thus, the fact-finder using this method would conclude
that the updated odds that defendant was the source are 200 to 1. 
In an article published early in the Bayesian debate, Finkelstein and Fairly180
suggested using Bayes’ theorem to aid jurors in cases in which the issue is the identity
of the perpetrator and the perpetrator has left trace evidence at the scene of the crime. 
They constructed a hypothetical case in which the accused is charged with murdering
his girlfriend, and the perpetrator of the crime left behind a hand print. They illustrated
how Bayes’ theorem could be used to get from the random match probability (the
frequency of handprint features in the general population) to an estimate of how likely it
was that the defendant left the print at the scene. 
In a celebrated reply, Professor Laurence Tribe, then an evidence teacher, 
raised several  objections to this use of Bayes’ theorem in the trial process. Jurors who
are not proposition bettors might have mistaken or inconsistent understandings of the
meaning of prior probability.181 There is a  danger of "dwarfing soft variables," that is,
the danger that the impressiveness of statistics would obscure other issues (such as
whether there might be an innocent explanation for the presence of the print). 
Moreover, uncertainty about facts upon which the Bayesian calculations would be
based could require additional quantification decisions about so many issues that use
182 For Bayes' Theorem to be helpful in the hypothetical described by Finkelstein and Fairley,
one has to assume that the person whose handprint is on the knife is guilty of being the killer, and that the
handprint expert is accurate. A factfinder who believed that these two facts were not certain would have
to discount the probability estimate obtained by using Bayes's theorem, and giving instructions about how
to do this would be too complicated to be feasible.  Tribe, supra note __, at 1361-65.
183 Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial
by Heuristics, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 123 (1980); David Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Bayes' Theorem in the
Trial Process, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988); Brian C. Smith, Steven D. Penrod, Amy L. Otto, and
Roger C. Park, Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (1996).
184 Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF
276 (1997). 
185 Cohen, 1977, supra note __.
186 David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 101.
187 See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Judicial Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF 254 (1997); Mike Redmayne, Presenting
Probabilities in Court: The DNA Experience, 1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF 187,
199-208 (1997) (although Professor Redmayne suggests with “some trepidation” that Bayesian
presentations will be appropriate in some cases, id. at 213, his article acknowledges and illustrates
practical and conceptual difficulties). See also Alex Stein, Judicial Fact-Finding and the Bayesian
Method: The Case for Deeper Skepticism About Their Combination, 1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
EVIDENCE AND PROOF 25 (1997).
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of the theorem would be more confusing than helpful.182 If there is a danger that the
expert might be mistaken about the frequency of the print, for example, that would have
to be taken into account somehow, but it would not be easy for a fact-finder to adjust
the statistics.  Tribe’s analysis was in turn criticized by psychologists for making faulty
psychological assumptions183 as well as by statisticians,184 philosophers,185 and legal
scholars.186
Bayesian skeptics have continued to point out problems with the use of Bayes in
the trial process.  Progressive updating using Bayes' theorem throughout the trial would
be so computationally complex that it would be beyond the capacity of fact-finders.
Moreover, trials are structured in such a way that the jury does not receive information
in a way that facilitates Bayesian updating. For example, the jury might have difficulty
formulating priors when it does not get instructions about the law until the end, and
hence does not know exactly what proposition it is supposed to decide.187
   To some extent, Bayesian enthusiasts and Bayesian skeptics seem to be talking past
each other.  The skeptics have demonstrated that it is not practical to use Bayesian
analysis very often in the course of trial, but most of the enthusiasts do not argue for
188 Friedman, supra note __.
189 See Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho- Bayesian [!?] Analysis
and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1991) (the bracketed punctuation [!?] is contained in
Professor Friedman’s original title); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1477 (1999).  Professor Uviller arrived at a similar conclusion without reference to
Bayes’ theorem.  See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U.PA.L. REV.  845, 867-68(1982 ) (“it seems quite likely that a guilty
person without prior convictions will lie on the stand as readily as will a guilty veteran, while innocent
people with extensive criminal histories will testify as truthfully as the innocent novice”).
190 See Richard Lempert, Of Flutes, Oboes, and the As If World of Evidence Law, 1
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF 253 (1997); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977).
191 Richard A. Friedman and Roger C. Park, Sometimes What Everybody Thinks They Know is
True, 27 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 29 (2003).
192 Lempert, Modeling Relevance, supra note __. 
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such a use.188   Bayesians often emphasize the value of Bayesian reasoning outside
the heat of trial, in assessing the value of rules excluding evidence or in  weighing the
probative value of certain types of evidence.  A basic Bayesian perspective asks about
the degree to which new evidence changes our estimate of the odds of a fact being
true, and tells us to compare the likelihood of finding the evidence if the fact were true
with the likelihood of finding it if the fact were false. It can, for example, help us
understand why prior convictions have little probative value in impeaching the testimony
of the accused in a criminal case. Learning of the evidence of the prior conviction does
not change our prior estimate of the odds that the defendant would lie.  If he is guilty of
a serious charge, the situational pressures to lie are so strong that even a generally
honest person likely would lie to escape punishment; learning the fact that he was
dishonest on an earlier occasion does not change the odds much. If he is innocent of
the charged crime, the situational pressures are likely to push him toward telling the
truth even if he is a veteran liar, and, anyway, it does not much matter if he lies his way
out of a false charge.189  Of course, one could arrive at the same insight without
knowledge of Bayes' theorem, but it seems likely that exposure to the approach helps
us be sensitive to the right factors in assessing probative
 value.190  Similarly, a Bayesian perspective can help us understand why evidence that
a man accused of murdering his wife had beaten her on previous occasions is
probative, despite the fact that spousal abuse is common and that very few abusers
progress to murder.191 Scholars have also relied on Bayesian models to analyze such
diverse evidentiary issues as the meaning of the concept of relevance,192 the value of
193 BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE (1997).
194 IAN EVETT & BRUCE WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR
FORENSIC SCIENTISTS (1998). 
195 Thomas Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value
of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1996). 
196 Peter Tillers & David A. Schum, Hearsay Logic, 76 MINN. L. REV. 813 (1992).
197 Stephen Ceci & R.D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal
Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33 (2000); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children's
Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1999). For other examples of 
applications of Bayes in evaluation of evidence law, see Richard Friedman, Towards a (Bayesian?)
Convergence, 1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF 348 (1997)
198 See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1551, 1610-16 (2001); Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment
of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match
Probability, 42  JURIMETRICS  J. 403 (2002).  For advocacy of the approach of telling the trier about the
likelihood ratio and explaining how to use it to combine DNA evidence with other evidence, see
Geoffrey K. Chambers, Stephen J. Cordiner, John S. Buckleton, Bernard Robertson, & G.A. Vignaux 
Forensic DNA Profiling: The Importance of Giving Accurate Answers to the Right Questions 8 CRIM.
L.F. 445 (1997).  See also Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE 20-21, 51-65
(1997) (supporting an approach under which a forensic expert explain to the trier of fact, “This evidence
is R times more probable if the accused left the mark than if someone else did. This evidence therefore
[very][strongly] supports the proposition that the accused left the mark.” Id. at 65).
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forensic identification evidence,193 the proper interpretation of DNA evidence,194 the
value of expert testimony in child abuse cases,195 the value of hearsay,196 and the
appropriateness of questioning children in a suggestive manner.197
A number of  Bayesian enthusiasts believe that the theorem can be useful at
trial, though few would argue for a step-by-step updating by applying Bayesian analysis
in a multi-step fashion to discrete pieces of evidence.  For example, in a DNA case one
might  aggregate all the non-DNA evidence, assign prior odds, and then multiply by a
likelihood ratio derived from the DNA evidence.  How to combine the evidence might be
demonstrated to the jury either by using a chart showing prior and posterior odds under
different assumptions about prior odds, or by telling them to multiply the prior odds by
the likelihood ratio.198  This approach is still problematic, for reasons discussed by
199
 Tribe, Precision and Ritual, supra note ___.
200 Allen, Algorithms, supra note ___.
201 On the infrequency of use of these Bayesian presentation methods except in
paternity cases, see 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 15-5.4 to 15-5.5, at 656-59 (1997) (with footnotes citing
illustrative cases).
202 David Kaye, Plemel as a Primer on Proving Paternity, 24 WILLAMETTE L. J. 867 (1988).
203 See, e.g., Kammer v. Young, 535 A.2d 936 (Ct. Spec. Appeals Md. 1988) (affirming
judgment in case in which expert, pursuant to command of Maryland statute, gave opinion as to
probability of paternity based on Bayesian calculation with assumed prior odds of .5). For
criticism of this approach, see Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important
Questions, Surprising Answers, 76 JUDICATURE 222 (1993); BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A.
VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE 25-27 (1995).  Of course, in many cases the 50% assumed
prior probability is generous to the defendant, and in any event the artificiality of the assumption
could be brought out on cross-examination and the expert asked to calculate the probability of
paternity based on other assumptions. 
204 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996).
205 William C. Thompson, Accepting Lower Standards: The National Research Council's Second
Report on Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS 405 (1997). 
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Tribe199 and Allen,200 and courts have been slow to adopt it.201 Proponents of decision
aids have nonetheless made some progress.  In paternity cases, for example, some
courts have allowed charts to be provided to jurors showing how a prior probability of
paternity should be revised in light of the paternity index (likelihood ratio) associated
with a genetic test.202 Experts sometimes use Bayes’ theorem in calculating an estimate
of paternity that they then offer to the trier as the probability of paternity, though this
procedure is controversial among scholars because it involves making an artificial
assumption that the prior probability of paternity is 50%.  This assumption is made
without taking into account the actual non-test evidence, so that the 50% figure would
be used even if there were convincing evidence that the defendant was sterile.203  The
National Research Council has suggested that experts might compute posterior
probabilities to show jurors the power of DNA evidence for establishing identity204
although this proposal also remains controversial.205
When Bayesian skeptics and Bayesian enthusiasts address common ground, 
there seems to be a degree of convergence.  Professor Allen, a leading Bayesian
206 Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Judicial Proof, supra note ___, at 258.
207
 Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF 276, 290 (1997).  See also  John A. Michon.  The Time Has Come
to Put This Debate Aside and Move On To  Other Matters, 1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
EVIDENCE AND PROOF 331-334  (1997).
208 Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and
Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); Jane Goodman, Jurors' Comprehension and
Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 361 (1992); Brian C. Smith, Steven D.
Penrod, Amy L. Otto, and Roger C. Park, Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
49 (1996); David L. Faigman & A. J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing
Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988); William C. Thompson &
Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy
and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987). 
209 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence:
Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1991).
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skeptic, has allowed that “there may very well be situations involving virtually purely
statistical evidential bases in which Bayes’ theorem would be a useful analytic tool,” and
that “the Bayesian sceptic does not deny a use for Bayes’ theorem as an analytical
tool.”206 Professor Friedman, a leading enthusiast, has written that, at least in cases in
which statistical evidence does not otherwise play a substantial role, there is “usually no
substantial reason to make an explicit presentation of probability theory; fact-finders
can deal with the evidence much as they deal with ordinary questions in their everyday 
lives.”207
Some of the Bayesian debaters are more prone to thought experiments than to
empirical research, but there have been efforts to test whether jurors are intuitive
Bayesians and whether Bayesian charts or instructions will aid decision-making.
Numerous studies have shown that most of the time human beings do not behave
according to the Bayesian ideal.208 Generally, humans are too conservative, failing to
adjust their prior estimates to the degree required by Bayesian models of rational
decision-making. In a more fundamental way, Bayesian modeling fails to capture the
decision processes of human decision-makers. Jurors appear to evaluate evidence in a
trial not by sequential updating but by constructing plausible narratives that might
account for the evidence.209  As some researcher have concluded: humans are story
tellers, not meter readers. But in cases in which the human story is supplemented by
forensic match evidence, there is some empirical evidence that human decision-making
might be improved, or at least come closer to the Bayesian norm, by use of a Bayesian
210 See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology, supra note ___, at 1610-16; Dale A.  Nance 
& Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a
Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS  J. 403 (2002).
211 William Twining, The New Evidence Scholarship, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 295 (1991). For a
leading example, see Peter Tillers & David  Schum, A Theory of Preliminary Fact Investigation, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 931 (1991). 
212 JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF PROOF: AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND
GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS (1913; 2nd ed. 1931; 3rd ed. 1937).
213 Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Taking Fact Analysis Seriously, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1442,
1447 (1993). See also BERNARD ROBERTS & G.A. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE (1995).
214 TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE: HOW TO DO THINGS
WITH FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE'S SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1991; 1998).
215 Namely, the improvements offered by ANDERSON & TWINING, id., and by such devices as
decision trees, influence diagrams, and Bayes networks. See ROBERTSON & VIGNAUX, 1995, supra note
__.
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chart showing the trier how estimates of prior probability should be changed by the
forensic evidence.210
Another thrust of “the new evidence scholarship” is concerned with inference and
decision-making in litigation, with the problem of processing evidence and drawing
inferences from it in order to prepare for trial, to try cases, and to decide them. It seeks
to develop theories of inference in the litigation context.211  This area of scholarship is
concerned with the problem of how lawyers can organize the mass of evidence in a case
in a meaningful and effective way if it is to be persuasive to factfinders. How are lawyers
to sort through the maze of evidence to determine which propositions that need to be
proved are supported by what evidence, in a complex interconnected hierarchy of raw
facts, intermediate inferences, and ultimate conclusions? 
Wigmore212 developed the first system for organizing and assessing evidence for
litigation by employing careful logic to trace the factual support for inferences.
“Wigmorian analysis is an attempt to capture the way we think when we think at our
best.”213 Wigmorian charting was a major milestone in lawyerly thinking about facts, but it
still was somewhat crude. Anderson and Twining214 not only resurrected Wigmorian
charting, but improved upon it, such as by enabling it to take into account the applicable
substantive law and by expanding it beyond requiring the chartist to have a single
 “ultimate probandum” in mind before starting. Instead, the chartist is able to explore
alternative conclusions to which the evidence might lead. Wigmorian and related kinds
of charting215 clarify the elements of evidence and their inter-relationships. Moreover, the
addition of an element to the chart is an implicit probability judgment of the element's
216
 Robertson & Vignaux, 1993, supra note __, at 1456.
217See William Twining, Some Scepticism about Some Scepticisms, in William Twining,
RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 92-134(1990 reprint of essay published in
1984)(few philosophers consistently maintain philosophical skepticism,  and the literature “poses
few threats to the centrality of concepts of Truth, Reason and Justice in any theory of Evidence “
Id. at 134 (Notes)); Mirjan Damaska, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 289
(1998)(when we engage in adjudication, we presuppose a world outside our statements; radical
postmodern thought has no bearing on evidence law);  Ronald J. Allen, Truth and Its Rivals, 49
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 309, 315, 317, 318 (1998)(“There is indeed an important philosophical
puzzle, but it is primarily how to explain what is obviously true”; the implications of scepticism
for the legal system are “marginal at best”; all the rivals to truth as a goal of litigation themselves
involve rejection or cabining of the philosophical problem of scepticism). But cf. D. Nicolson,
Truth, Reason, and Justice: Epistemology and Politics in Evidence Discourse, 57 MOD. L. REV.
726 (1994), critiqued in John D. Jackson, Modern Trends in Evidence Scholarship: Is All Rosy in
the Garden?, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 893, 898-99 (2003)
218See William Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in William
Twining, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 32-91 (1990). 
219Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 995 (1994).  For comments on  critiques of the rationalist tradition, see John D. Jackson,
Modern Trends in Evidence Scholarship: Is all Rosy in the Garden?   21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
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importance. It is a small step to add quantified probability statements either of the
empirical kind or the chartist's subjective probability of the element.216
We should add a brief mention of  evidence scholars who have addressed
philosophical  issues about  the foundations of knowledge.   At least three distinguished
evidence scholars have assessed the significance of   philosophical skepticism to the
law of evidence.  Despite some differences, they have essentially concluded  that   that
lawyers and evidence  scholars  need not worry about the implications of profound
skepticism.217   The basic suppositions of a system of litigation require rejecting profound
skepticism, even if one sees goals other than truth-finding to be central. 
There is, however, a debate about the extent to which we should enthrone truth-
finding as the central goal of evidence law and believe that the goal can be
accomplished.  Professor William Twining has noted and described the tradition of
“optimistic rationalism” in evidence law and evidence scholarship.218 Professor Michael
Siegel has argued that philosophical pragmatism is a better foundation for thinking about
evidence than optimistic rationalism.  He posits  that the rationalist tradition has caused
too great an emphasis on truth-finding, causing theorists to underestimate the value of
other goals, such as making verdicts more acceptable to the public and ending disputes
in an efficient way.219  In contrast, and without relying to the same degree upon the
893, 898-901  (2003). 
220Charles  Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability
of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985). For critique, see Ronald J. Allen, Rationality,
Mythology, and the 'Acceptability of Verdicts' Thesis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 541 (1986). 
22187 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (2001)    
222Id. at 1494, 97. 
223 Id. at 1503, 1511, 1516-25.
224Id at 1492-93, 1499.  For a rebuttal, see Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and
the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 1551 (2001).   Cf.  Brian Leiter, The
Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good
Philosophy of Evidence  1997 B.Y.U.L. REV. 803 (arguing that Daubert makes unrealistic
demands on the epistemic capacities of  adjudicators)
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literature on philosophy, Professor Nesson has argued that the legal system already
gives primacy to making verdicts acceptable instead of to finding the truth.220
Professors Allen and Leiter have sought to bring lawyers up to date on
epistemology in an exploration of contemporary work on naturalized epistemology. . 
Though their work is tough sledding for readers  without a background in philosophy,  it
reaches conclusions that should be comforting to interdisciplinary evidence scholars. As
Allen and Leiter themselves note,  "For the great bulk of evidentiary scholars, then, this
article merely solidifies the ground beneath their feet."221 They maintain that philosophy
should not be an a priori discipline, but one that is continuous with a posteriori inquiry in
the empirical sciences.222 They approve of a functional approach to evidence law,
assessing the wisdom of rules in light of their social effects, and using the  tools of social
science to study consequences of legal rules: hypotheses should be tested    empirically
and discarded them in the face of disconfirming data.  Their illustrations of this
proposition include criticism of some of Judge Posner’s   speculative conclusions about
the economics of evidence law.223Finally, because naturalized epistemology is
instrumental, evidence rules should only require intellectual performances that fact-
finders are capable of doing – “ought implies can” – a position that they see as militating
against searches for formal “algorithms,” such as Bayes theorem, for use in fact-finding
at trial.224
IV. Feminist Evidence Scholarship
Since 1990, an increasing number of law review articles have examined evidence
law from a feminist perspective. Most of this scholarship has dealt with evidence 
225 See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape
Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663 (1998) (supporting rape shield legislation but opposing legislation
admitting prior sex crimes of the alleged perpetrator).
226 See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law,
110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997); Orenstein, supra note ___.
227 Compare Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Syndrome Issue and its Implication for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395,398
(1985) (“RTS evidence can help the fact finder resolve difficult issues of guilt or innocence and that such
evidence can educate jurors and judges, which may help correct erroneous social attitudes about the
crime of rape”)  with Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric
Labeling, and Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1277 (1994) (“The introduction of rape trauma syndrome
evidence in criminal trials has probably assisted in convicting rapists, but at the cost of reinforcing the
very myths and assumptions that early feminists fought so hard to eliminate”). 
228
 For scholars who have urged that the victim not be allowed to invoke spousal immunity to
refuse to testify against a battering husband, see Malinda Seymore, Isn’t It a Crime: Feminist
Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1032 (1996) (the husband is
likely to coerce the wife into not testifying, and treating the matter as “private” violates feminist norms)
and Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (favoring mandated victim participation in domestic
violence cases for a variety of reasons, including deterrence and the educative function of the law).  
229 See Lisa Marie DeSanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for
Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359 (1996).  (arguing for admission to combat
gender bias, educate jury about nature of batterers, and overcome problems caused by lack of other
evidence and coerced nonparticipation by victims).  See also Lisa A. Linsky, Use of Domestic Violence
History Evidence in the Criminal Prosecution: A Common Sense Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 73 (1995);
Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1463 (1996).
230 Battered women syndrome testimony, as represented in the work of Lenore Walker, is
sometimes offered into evidence to explain the conduct of women who kill their husbands.  See generally
LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (1984).  Walker posits that women who do not leave their battering husbands are
experiencing “learned helplessness,” a phenomenon similar to that experienced by dogs in an experiment
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doctrines that relate to sexual assault and spousal abuse.  The sexual assault topics
include rape shield rules,225 exceptions to the rule against character evidence for prior
crimes of the alleged perpetrator,226 and admissibility of rape trauma syndrome
testimony.227  Spousal abuse topics have included whether victims should be forced to
testify over a claim of spousal immunity,228 whether prior acts of domestic violence
against other victims should be admissible,229 and admissibility of social science
evidence in spousal abuse cases, including testimony about battered woman’s
syndrome.230  Feminist scholars have also addressed evidence issues the impact of
where dogs which could not control the electric shocks they were receiving simply stopped trying to
avoid them. BWS theory has been criticized both as degrading to women and as based on poor social
science methodology, a criticism to which the present authors subscribe. See Erica Beecher-Monas,
Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the Law of Evidence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 81
(2001) (criticizing BWS as degrading and methodologically flawed, and advocating admission of social
context evidence and PTSD testimony) and Regina Schuller & Sara Rzepa, The Battered Woman
Syndrome and Other Psychological Effects of Domestic Violence Against Women, § 11, in MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman, David H.
Kaye, Michael J. Saks & Joseph Sanders eds., 2002) (reviewing the empirical research on which BWS
theory is based); David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARIZONA L. REV. 67 (1997); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities
in Admission of Social Science Evidence in Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41
(Fall 2001) (arguing that feminists seek admission of social science evidence that fails the
Daubert test, and asserting that this goal is pursued at the expense of socially disadvantaged
criminal defendants, such as young African-American males). Cf., Myrna S. Raeder, Battered
Woman and Batterer Syndrome: The Double-edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman
Syndrome by and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 789, 797 (1996) (noting deficiencies in empirical support for Walker’s cycle of violence
thesis, but saying that “acceptance of the cycle is justified in cases where the factual foundation
supports its existence in the particular relationship in question”). Some authors have suggested
substitutes, such as evidence about other social science findings about domestic abuse. See id.;
Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of Batterers’ Profiles and Expert “Social
Framework” Background in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147
(1997).   
231 Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 159 (1997) (excited utterance exception reflects male perspective; calm
statements of sexual assault victims should also be admissible, subject to conditions).
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 which upon women is less obvious, including the excited utterance exception,231 the
232 Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy
Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221 (1999) (apologies should, like offers of
compromise and remedial measures, be protected from use against the apologizer). The role of apologies
has become a topic of considerable interest at the intersection of evidence and torts. See, e.g., Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICHIGAN L. REV. 460
(2004).
233
 In two articles, Kim Lane Scheppele has argued that the law gives too much credence to
initial stories to the derogation of revised versions of events, one example being the use of prior
statements to impeach.  See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts Ma’am: Sexualized Violence,
Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992) and Kim Lane
Scheppele, The Ground-Zero Theory of Evidence, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 321 (1998). 
234 See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Science Evidence: Foundations, 5
MICH. J. OF GENDER & LAW 1 (1998); Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism has to Offer Evidence Law, 28
SOUTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 171, 211 (1999)(favoring an approach to expert testimony that allows “all
relevant voices and perspectives” to be heard; “For example, informing the jury about weaknesses in
certain social science evidence and allowing it to be admitted subject to certain reliability safeguards may
often be preferable to a flat exclusionary rule if the social science helps convey an excluded group’s
voice”). 
Some feminist scholars question the methodological rigor to which good science aspires and they
advocate – to greater or lesser degrees – more intuitive, contextual, narrative, and relational paths to
knowledge. One of the more extreme statements of this view is offered by Catherine MacKinnon:
If feminism is a critique of the objective standpoint as male, then we also disavow
standard scientific norms as the adequacy criteria for our theory, because the objective
standpoint we criticize is the posture of science.  In other words, our critique of the
objective standpoint as male is a critique of science as a specifically male approach to
knowledge. With it, we reject male criteria for verification.
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), at 50.  One can also find traces of an
ascientific attitude in articles that assess the validity or social value of battered womens’ testimony on
grounds other than standard measures of scientific validity.  See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42 (1991). Cf. Kit
Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 ILL. L. REV. 413, 445-47 (1991). 
One need not look far for examples of errors resulting from poor research design that have had
profoundly detrimental effects on women. A recent example is provided by developments in knowledge
about hormone replacement therapy. Less rigorous research design (observational) led to the belief that
estrogen replacement was beneficial. Better research design (experimental) led to the conclusion that
such treatment was dangerous, and that over the decades of its use had caused women tens of thousands
of unnecessary breast cancers, heart attacks, and strokes. JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE
BENEFITS RISKS AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2004).
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party admission doctrine,232 use of inconsistent statements to impeach,233 and the
increased rigor Daubert demands of expert testimony.234
A number of feminist evidence scholars have classified feminist legal theory into
three categories, noting that scholars from different strands of feminism might have
235 See Seymore, supra note __, at 1066-67 (dividing the feminist legal movement into “liberal
feminism,” “relational feminism,” and “radical feminism”).  See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, What
Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 171 (1999).  Cf. Orenstein, Apology Excepted,
supra note __, at 226-27 (difference feminism, dominance feminism, and postmodern feminism). 
236 Kinports summarized some of these differences as follows:
Men tend to value autonomy, abstract reasoning, individual rights,
hierarchical organization, and detachment from others, [feminists] said,
whereas women are more likely to value relationships, contextual
reasoning, interdependence, and connection and responsibility to others. 
Kit Kinports, Evidence and Procedure for the Future: Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413,
417 (1991).  See generally Taslitz, supra note __.
237 As an example, see generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
238
“Feminists have long realized that the absence of the state, of law, from the private sphere has
itself contributed to male dominance and female subordination. . . .  The battered women's movement has
been, in the past twenty years, enormously successful in bringing the 'private' problem of wife abuse to
public attention. . . .” Seymore, supra note ___ at 1071.
239 See, e.g., Orenstein, No Bad Men, supra note __, at 692 (opposing Rule 413, in part because
it perpetuates misconception that rape is not pervasive); Baker, supra note __, at 591 (discussing whether
56
different views about law.235  The first is liberal feminism, sometimes dubbed “sameness”
feminism.  Liberal feminists are said to favor formal equality with men, assuming that
women can compete in the same way as men, and not emphasizing differences
between men and women. Radical feminists, sometimes called “dominance” feminists,
see patriarchy and male domination of women, especially sexual domination, as the key
to understanding modern society and its laws.  A third strain of feminism, sometimes
called “difference” feminism or “cultural” feminism, notes differences between men and
women and argues for the legitimacy or superiority of the female perspective.  These
authors express a wide variety of views, some of them shared with strains of critical legal
theory or postmodernism.  These views include valuing intuition and emotion;  believing
in contextualized thinking instead of abstract, rigid rules; and emphasizing the value of
relationships over market-like competition.236
In some writers, one also sees an emphasis on narratives over, or as an equal
partner with, quantitative social science.237  Others have reservations about the public-
private distinction, arguing that it has been used to shield the abuse of women by
treating what goes on in the home as a “private” matter, beyond the reach of the law.238
There is also more attention to the law’s constitutive role in helping define society and
perpetuate views of the world.239  Sometimes one also sees a belief in the pervasiveness
Rule 413 spreads or diminishes rape myths, and concluding that it perpetuates a stereotype of the chronic
rapist); Taslitz, supra note __, at 180; Marilyn MacCrimmon, The Social Construction of Reality and the
Rules of Evidence, 25 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 36 (1991); Mahoney, supra note __, at 7 (noting
interaction of law and culture and advocating “separation assault” as a legal concept that can “reshape
cultural understanding”). 
240 See Taslitz, supra note __, at 213-17. 
241 See WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 32-91 (1990).
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and inevitability of politics, and a result-oriented approach that deprecates the wisdom or
feasibility of achieving objective solutions to social problems.240  The “cultural” strand of
feminism seems to present the most obvious challenge to what William Twining called
the tradition of “optimistic rationalism” in evidence scholarship.241
The influence of this strand of feminism on specific doctrinal reform is likely to be
limited until the rest of the world changes, however, because of a tension between the
results of a conflict resolution model based on cultural feminism and the more immediate
goal of fair outcomes for women litigants. An emphasis on contextualized decision-
making that explores all of the relational nuances of a situation militates against having
fixed rules, and in favor of discretionary decision-making.  But if decision-makers have
attitudes tainted by sexism, then fixed rules are needed to protect women, since
discretion will be exercised against them.  Hence it is helpful to have as rigid a rule as
possible against admission of the  complainant’s sexual history in rape cases.  Similarly,
the hierarchical and competitive features of the adversarial system might be softened by
feminist influences into a proof-taking system that encouraged cooperation and
mediation. 
Moreover, evidence law is adjective law, and it is hard to predict what  substantive
effect a particular evidence proposal will have.  For example, an approach toward tough
screening of "junk science" supported by large manufacturers seeking to escape liability
in products liability cases can have the unexpected effect of hurting the prosecution in
criminal cases.  Similarly, liberal admission of rape trauma syndrome testimony can
backfire when defendants in rape cases want to put in evidence of absence of
symptoms to support the conclusion that the complainant was not raped.   Thus, it may
be harder for a substantive agenda, such as that of liberal feminism or dominance
feminism, to be reflected in evidence law, because one can see ahead of time that it
might cut both ways.  
Perhaps for that reason, the areas in which reforms advocated by feminists, and
by others concerned with fair treatment of women, seem to have been most effective
and widely accepted are those in which the beneficial impact of the reform in helping
women is predictable because women are disproportionately the victims of a particular
crime.  These include “rape shield” statutes protecting sexual assault victims from
242 Orenstein, No Bad Men, supra note __, at 692; Baker, supra note __. The rape statistics are
controversial.  See Roger C.  Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 717, 765-69 (1998);
Neil Gilbert, Miscounting Social Ills: Sexual Assault and Advocacy Research, WELFARE JUSTICE 84-129
(1995).
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 Mahoney, supra note __. 
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“[T]his article offers narratives and poems from the lives of survivors of domestic violence,
and a few from the stories of non-survivors, as part of its analysis and argument.  Seven women's stories
have come to me through their own accounts.  Five of these have at some time identified themselves as
battered women. . . .  The other women's voices in this paper are drawn from identified published
sources. . . .   One of these stories is my own.” Id. at 7. 
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revelation of sexual history and exceptions to the character evidence rule for prior crimes
committed by the accused in sex crime and domestic violence cases. 
Much of the feminist writing on evidence is consistent with all three of the above-
described strands of feminism, including liberal feminism, and hence its method is not
too different from what might be obtained by a conventional legal analyst concerned with
fair treatment of women. But sometimes dominance feminism or cultural feminism
seems to have led in directions that a conventional legal analyst might not follow. 
Without attempting a comprehensive review of the literature, we will refer to four leading
articles in which dominance feminism or cultural feminism seems to have been
particularly influential on the analysis or result.  
Our first examples are two articles about  Rule 413, which allows evidence that
the accused committed other sexual assaults to be admitted in a sexual assault
prosecution.  Aviva Orenstein and Katherine Baker, working independently, both came
to the conclusion that the legislation was unwise and unjustifiable. Strains of cultural
feminism and dominance feminism can be seen in both works.  The legislation is seen
as unwise because it decontextualizes the situation by stereotyping rapists, treating
them as pathological outlaws rather than normal men engaged in situational conduct. It
is also seen as perpetuating rape “myths” about rape being strange and deviant,
whereas the authors see it as common and widespread, and as a way that society
controls women.  Finally, because  rape is so common, men who have raped do not
particularly stand out from other men, and hence rape has less probative force than
would be the case were it a rare phenomenon.242
Another example of scholarship that seems influenced by strands of cultural
feminism is Martha Mahoney’s article about spousal abuse cases.243 She addresses the
question why women do not leave abusive relationships. Much of her article consists of
narratives, including her own, of battered women.244  She finds nothing to criticize about
Lenore Walker’s methodology, though she has mixed feelings about the message sent
245
“I do not mean to criticize here the psychological theory underlying battered woman
syndrome, or even the particular theory of learned helplessness. First, the collection of
experience and perception summed up in battered woman syndrome are descriptively true of
many women. [Here Mahoney cites two amicus briefs.] Lenore Walker's defense of expert
testimony is also correct: it helps women's stories be brought into court by bringing together
fragments that women experience as part of a whole relationship. [Citation omitted.] Finally, I
would not choose to discard such a major tool in the effort to explain women's experience in
court, just because it has proved vulnerable to distortion in culture and law – we need more, not
less, explanation.  However, as long as explanation emphasizes ‘helplessness’ in the psychology
of individual women, it runs into the danger of contributing to stereotyping.” Id. at 42.  For an
argument that the admission  of BWS evidence reflects  a political judgment in favor of battered
women who kill  rather than a judgment about the   the scientific validity of the syndrome, and
that recognition that the evidence is admitted in pursuit of a “solution to a specific social problem
rather than entirely neutral applications of basic evidentiary principles” may “inhibit the
expansion of the principles developed in battered woman self-defense cases to more problematic
situations” see Robert P. Mosteller,  Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence
Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 478-515 (1996)
246
“Because of the interactive relationships between law and culture in this area, law reform
requires such an approach to simultaneously reshape cultural understanding.  Separation assault is
particularly easy to grasp because it responds to prevailing cultural and legal inquiry (‘why didn't she
leave’) with a twist emphasizing the batterer's violent quest for control.” Id. at 7. 
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by learned helplessness,245 and advocates using the concept of “separation assault” as
being more central to understanding why the battered woman, who is likely to be
assaulted upon separating, does not leave the abusive relationship.246
Reliance on narratives is sometimes said to be a characteristic of feminist writing,
and Mahoney’s article is a good example of extensive use of narratives.  She uses
stories from acquaintances, from the facts of reported cases, and from other published
sources as social fact evidence to support her views of domestic violence.  While she
does not reject quantitative social science, she seems to have an attitude toward proof
of social facts that would differ from that of many social scientists and Daubert-era
evidence experts. She is indifferent to defects in the methodology of Walker’s battered
woman research, assessing the theory primarily in terms of its utility in telling a story of
oppression and the countervailing danger that the story may degrade women.  She uses
anecdotal evidence extensively, and regards it as a source of convincing proof instead
of a source of hypotheses to be tested.  Stories from the author’s acquaintances and
from reported cases would be viewed with suspicion by many social scientists, because
of the small sample size and obvious problems of selection bias. (For one thing, the
typicality of facts stated in reported cases is highly suspect, because trial of a question
of fact is itself an aberration; the typical dispute never reaches the legal system, much
less survive to trial and appeal.)  Narratives and counter-narratives can be produced on
almost any issue.  It is not clear that feminists rely on anecdotal evidence more than the
247 See id. at 27-28 (noting “split between social scientists and feminist activists on domestic
violence issues”; complaining about “gender-neutral approach” of some social scientists; arguing that
funding sources have affected how issues were explored and what research was done, and that
“conscious use of feminist methodology in research is rare.”)
248
 Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am, supra note __.
249 Id. at 128.
250 Id. at 138-39.
251 Id. at 142-43.
252 Id. at 138-41.
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conventional fireside policy analyst, which includes most lawyers, though feminist writers
seem more ready to reveal their reliance on it and even revel in it.  In some cases, this
may be due to suspicion of the motives and funding sources of social scientists,247 or
simply to belief in the power of general feminist theory to guide the way in deciding
which narratives to believe. 
The final example is an article by Kim Lane Scheppele entitled Just the Facts,
Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth.248  This
article, using the Anita Hill hearings as its point of departure, posits that impeachment of
witnesses by showing that they delayed in making a complaint or that they gave
inconsistent versions of a complaint at different times hurts women disproportionately.249
In cases of sexualized violence, such as rape, sexual harassment, or spousal abuse,
victims often delay in reporting and do not report a full or accurate version the first
time.250  They then suffer when impeached with evidence of delay in reporting or of prior
inconsistent statements.  But victims have legitimate reasons for delay and revision. 
They are traumatized by the attack. Or they fear being criticized by the dominant culture
for being a victim, for example, for provoking the attack.251  Or they do not perceive the
full implications of, say, sexual harassment until after they have thought about it or
perhaps had therapy.  Instead, they may present initial accounts that try to repair
relationships and make things normal again.252
In addition to her points that are specific to women and sexualized violence,
Scheppele has a more general point rooted in postmodern epistemology.  Invoking
Wittgenstein, she notes that accounts of events (“stories”) are narratives that are
influenced by interpretive frameworks.  A woman who interprets her husband’s violence
toward her as expressing his love does not see an event of battering the same way that
a feminist lawyer sees it.  But the difference in accounts that the feminist lawyer and the
battered woman would give is not, Scheppele writes, a difference “between truth and
falsehood,” but a difference in interpretive frameworks.  Consciousness raising may
cause the same person to see the same event in different ways.  The second
253 Id. at 172. 
254
 “Courts’ exclusion of revised stories works disproportionately against women because
women are disproportionately the victims of a socialization that masks the immediate recognition of
sexualized abuse as abuse.” Id. at 169-70. 
255
 Scheppele recognizes this point in a later article on the same subject, in which she says that,
“What I have argued so far is that the Federal Rules of Evidence show a strong preference for acquiring
information as close in time and space to the events in issue as possible. This does not mean that all other
information is excluded. Certainly not. It means, however, that whatever is said and done at the time of
the trouble will always have a place in the evidence that must be considered.” Scheppele, Ground-Zero,
supra note __, at 330. 
256 Id. at 334. 
257
 Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am, supra note __, at 167 n.174. 
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interpretation may be better, just as a revised paper is better than the original. 
Understanding how accounts of facts are “socially constituted” is necessary to liberate
women from sexualized violence:
[F]act-finders need to understand that early narratives about
sexualized violence may reveal not some deeper truth, but
rather the effects of oppression on women. Not allowing
women to reinterpret their own experiences as they learn to
oppose the abuse is a way of furthering that oppression.253
Scheppele’s solution for this perceived unfairness is not entirely clear.  In her first article
on the subject she complained about judicial “exclusion” of revised accounts, which
would be manifestly unfair treatment if “exclusion” meant exclusion from evidence.254
The revised accounts are not excluded from evidence, of course, but merely subject to
impeachment by prior inconsistent statements.255  Though an operational solution is not
offered in any detail, Scheppele’s general message is clear – that “much more sympathy
and belief” should be given the revised stories, even when they contradict what was said
at the time of the events that led to the litigation.256  Though she relies on examples from
cases involving sexual violence and harassment, she seems to call for application of her
perspective to all kinds of cases.   
The importance of freshness of memory is a psychological insight that is not often
questioned, and Scheppele is effective in making us think twice about it. However, she
could have done more to combine feminist social science with other studies of
perception and memory. In her principal article, Scheppele virtually ignores the extensive
body of literature on eyewitness testimony, except for one unexplained cite to Elizabeth
Loftus.257  Some of the psychology scholarship on eyewitnesses would be helpful to her
argument – studies suggesting, for example, that consistency in description of suspects
258 See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 93-95 (1995).
259
 In the latter article, Scheppele seems more receptive to the idea that reflection can
contaminate memories, and is somewhat broader in her citation of social science literature. In Scheppele,
Ground-Zero, supra note __, at 325-26, she notes psychological experiments on the decay of memory,
writing that “subjects in experiments often show that their memories can in fact be predictably altered by
the introduction of new information, and they unproblematically (even unconsciously) take into account
the new information as if it were part of the original memory. . . .” This, of course, is a very good reason
to distrust factual accounts given after there has been some time for reflection, for time affords
possibilities for distortion even if one assumes that reflection itself does not distort. 
260
 Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SOUTHWESTERN U.
L. REV. 171, 211(1999)(passage quoted n. ___, supra)
261 See Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship: Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REV. 849, 849 n. 2
(1991). Some might say that Jeremy Bentham was an exception. But Bentham was a long time ago; his
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE was published in 1827. He was less an economist than a utilitarian
philosopher (and cognitivist). His solution to any problem of evidence was to abolish rules and rely on
the discretion of judge and jury. And his work has been all but ignored by evidence scholars of the 20th
Century. See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985). 
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is not a strong predictor of accuracy.258 Other parts of this body of scholarship would not
strengthen Scheppele's argument – studies of the contaminating effect of post-event
information and suggestive interviewing are examples.259
In summary, feminist evidence scholarship sometimes reflects an attitude that
favors qualitative anecdotal data (such as narratives) over systematic quantitative
analysis, that views science as irredeemably political, or that at least views general
feminist theory as a better guide to social facts than the sorts of expertise and data
generally favored by scientists and by Daubert. For example, Professor Taslitz opposes
using a “flat exclusionary rule” for evidence which “helps to convey an excluded group’s
voice,” even if the evidence fails more conventional criteria such as whether the
methodology that produces the evidence is valid by the conventions of science.260 This
attitude may explain why discussions of battered women’s syndrome sometimes seem
result-oriented, as if the portrait that the theory paints of women is more important in
judging its acceptability than the validity of the research methods that produced it.  
V. Economics and Evidence
Until quite recently it could be said that law and economics scholars had virtually
nothing to say about evidence law.261 This is not exactly surprising. Evidence scholarship
is focused on understanding, explaining, evaluating, and suggesting improvements for
rules that are concerned principally with the goal of maximizing the ability of trials to
262 See, e.g., William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 MOD. L. REV. 261, 272
(1984):
The most striking feature of [evidence scholarship] is how homogeneous it is. 
Nearly all of the Anglo-American writers from Gilbert to Cross have shared
essentially the same basic assumptions about the nature and ends of adjudication
and about what is involved in proving facts in this context.... It can be re-stated
simply in some such terms as these: the primary end of adjudication is rectitude of
decision, that is the correct application of rules of substantive law to facts that
have been proved to an agreed standard of truth or probability. The pursuit of truth
in adjudication must at times give way to other values and purposes, such as the
preservation of state security or of family confidences; disagreements may arise as
to what priority to give to rectitude of decision as a social value and to the nature
and scope of certain competing values....  But the end of the enterprise is clear: the
establishment of truth. 
See other citations and quotations in Chris Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of
Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (2001).
263 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 993 (1990).
264 Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial
Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias, 16 J. L., ECON. AND ORG. 365 (2000).
265 Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert's Debut: the Supreme Court, the Economics of Scientific Evidence
and the Adversarial System, 4 SUPREME COURT ECON. REV. 1 (1995).
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discover the truth of a matter in dispute.262 Various fields might contribute to this
endeavor: logic, cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, feminism, statistics, and so
on. But economics? The first great law and economics movement, of the late nineteenth
century,263 involved the macroeconomics of law. It  was concerned with political
economy, the behavior of markets, economic systems; and was reflected in such law as
that of anti-trust, taxation, and banking regulation.  The second great law and economics
movement – the one with which readers of this article will be more familiar, involved the
microeconomics of law, the pursuit of efficiency and wealth maximization. It has been
concerned with the effects on individual behavior of varying incentive structures, and 
has been reflected in economic analyses of  torts, contracts, property, and criminal law.
What could marginalism or wealth maximization have to do with the truth-seeking goals
of evidence law? 
Only recently has there been a broad-gaged attempt to apply microeconomics to
evidence law. To be sure, there were  occasional articles on incentives and disincentives
for gathering evidence,264 how those incentives affect the evidence received by courts,265
the resulting outcomes of trials and the impact of those outcomes on behavior
266 David Crump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What Information Should Jurors Be Given
to Determine the Amount of a Punitive-damage Award?, 57 MD. L. REV. 174 (1998). 
267 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477
(1999).
268 But see the discussion, infra, of Sanchirico’s work. 
269 For more thorough critiques of Posner’s article, see: Richard Lempert, The Economic
Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619 (2001); Ronald J. Allen &
Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and The Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001); Roger C.
Park, Grand Perspectives on Evidence Law,  87 VA. L. REV. 2055 (2001).
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(especially economic activity) outside of court.266 These focused mainly on the problems
of assembling evidence for trials and the effects of verdicts.  Recently, we have seen
broader attempts to use apply economics to evidence law and the philosophy of
evidence.  We will focus on three articles which illustrate this new contribution to
evidence scholarship. 
Perhaps fittingly, the first broad major law and economics treatment of evidence
law is by Richard Posner, tackling a wide range of evidence topics.267 In his article,
Judge Posner’s assumptions about rational planning often lead him to inferences about
that evidence rules' strong ex ante effects.  His perspective entails implicit assumptions
about pervasive knowledge of the rules among the general population, and about the
friction-free willingness of actors to change customary ways of doing things in order to
obtain an advantage if they ever wind up in litigation, assumptions which sometimes
seem unrealistic.  As might be expected, Judge Posner also brings to his study of
evidence law a sensitivity to costs, trade-offs, and substitutions.
Posner’s rational choice, ex ante perspective, would not appear to be the best
starting point when drawing inferences about the issues that are at the core of traditional
American evidence law. Many rules, such as the hearsay and character evidence bans,
have long been viewed as being tailored with cognitive biases in mind, and aim to
control reasoning at trial rather than future primary conduct.268 They seek to protect
against mistaken, unreasonable, or lawless interpretations of evidence by factfinders. In
assessing the value of these rules, the psychological literature seems a more obvious
starting point. But Posner is fearless in applying his perspective, even to seemingly
unpromising topics such as character evidence.269
 We will describe and discuss some of those ideas. First, some of the good ones.
In his discussion of search and seizure, Posner assesses the value of sanctions
other than exclusion of evidence, such as damage remedies for illegal searches. 
Posner argues that if these alternative sanctions were effective, there would be  
evidentiary gain because the searches would not be made in the first place.  Therefore,
270 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
271 Posner, supra note ___ at 1533.
272
 For commentary on the blue bus problem, see Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability
Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV.L.REV. 530,  (1989); Ronald J. Allen,  On the
Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: a Clarification of the "Naked Statistical
Evidence" Debate, The Meaning of "Evidence," and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt,  65 TUL.L. REV. 1093 (1991); Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of Statistical
Evidence, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 457 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, A Response to Professor Allen, 65 TUL. L. REV.
1111 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, A Response to Professor Callen, 65 TUL. L. REV. 499 (1991). 
273 Posner, supra note __, at 1510.
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those who oppose Mapp v. Ohio270 ought to be arguing about the definition of illegal
search rather than about the sanction.271  Scholars from the law and economics
perspective seem able to come up with that sort of realization much more readily than
others. 
Next, there is the famous Blue bus conundrum.272 Suppose a plaintiff is
negligently injured by a bus, but cannot determine what bus company owned the bus
that hurt him. And suppose it can be learned that bus Company A runs 51 buses along
the route where the accident occurred, while Company B runs 49 buses there. Should
the “naked” statistical fact that the defendant Company A owns 51% of the buses be
admissible and sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the
defendant’s buses caused the plaintiff’s injuries? Here is part of Posner’s analysis of this
problem: 
Suppose both parties do conduct a thorough investigation yet are
unable to come up with any additional evidence bearing on the ownership
of the bus. There is no longer a basis for suspicion that the plaintiff really
believes that a bus owned by Company B hit him, or for punishing him for
not having investigated more. The case may seem no different from any
other one tried under the preponderance of the evidence standard in which
the balance of probabilities tilts only slightly in favor of the plaintiff. But
there is a difference. Suppose the legal system can identify an entire class
of cases in which the balance of probabilities tilts as slightly in favor of the
plaintiff as it does in the bus case. If there are 1000 such cases, then
allowing them to be tried can be expected to yield 510 correct decisions
(that is, 510 decisions in which the defendant was in fact the injurer) and
490 incorrect ones, while not allowing them to be tried can be expected to
yield 490 correct decisions and 510 erroneous ones. The social benefits of
the twenty additional correct decisions that allowing the 1000 cases to be
tried would produce – benefits in more perfect deterrence of negligent
accidents – would probably fall short of the social cost of 1000 trials.273
274 On the other hand, if the analysis is correct, it would seem that the decision whether to allow
the evidence would turn on what proportion of the Blue bus company’s buses run on that route. At some
point, the gain in accuracy becomes worth the administrative and transaction costs. So it would seem that
a rule setting a higher threshold for admission of such evidence would be the efficient solution in such
cases.
275 Id. at 1510.
276The bus-monopoly comment occurs at one of two places in which Judge Posner puts an
exclamation point after a speculative comment  about ex ante effects. See Posner, supra n. ____, at 1510
(Posner’s present comment that allowing naked statistical evidence to sustain “blue bus” verdict might
lead to bus monopoly), 1532 (comment that abrogating attorney-client privilege might increase
enrollment in law schools, because clients would seek to learn more about the law themselves) 
Professor Lempert has decoded this punctuation  to mean  that Judge Posner was  joking.  See Richard
Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619,
1671, 1690 (2001) If so, this is an   unusual way to signal  humor, and one is left puzzled about
how to treat other passages that lacked exclamation points but also seemed far-fetched. 
277 Allen & Leiter, supra note ___, at 1526 (citation omitted).
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Posner’s analysis makes the useful policy point that admitting the evidence, and
therefore allowing the trials to go forward, has the virtue of reaching more correct results,
but there is a disproportionate social cost of that marginal improvement in accuracy.274
Now we turn to some bad ideas. Posner argues that if the bus case were allowed
to go to the jury, bus company A would have a big incentive to be careful and bus
company B would have little or no incentive. Over time, B would cause more accidents,
though with fewer busses, since it would be less careful; moreover, a monopoly would
eventually be created because A, burdened by higher liability costs, would withdraw from
the route.275
Judge Posner seems to enjoy revving up his models and seeing where they go,
and it is not clear that he is completely serious in his remark about the demise of bus
company A.276  At any rate, the consequence   predicted is speculative and that it fails to
take account of likely changes in behavior.    If the companies really reacted that
strongly to the burden of having liability imposed on the basis of naked statistical
evidence, then they might instead each reduce the number of busses in an attempt to
have fewer than half, thus leading to a race to the bottom.277  But it seems more likely
either that naked statistical cases would be so rare as not to affect conduct at all, or that
if the companies did feel pressure to reduce the  number of busses, that  there would be
countervailing incentives that lead to adjustments in conduct, such as use of safety
measures, that  would make it worthwhile for the dominant company  to bear the
litigation burden while continuing to operate.  Consumers might even prefer the larger
and safer company, paying a premium for its services.  Only one thing is clear: the ex
278 Posner supra note ___ at 1525.
279 See Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 758-63
(1998). Prediction systems using actuarial methods commonly use prior crimes as a predictor.
See  PETER HOFFMAN, PREDICTING CRIMINALITY, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE STUDY GUIDE (1988)
and VERNON L. QUINSEY, GRANT T. HARRIS, MARNIE E. RICE & CATHERINE A. CORMIER,
VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK (1998).   See also MICHAEL R.
GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME, passim and 107 (1990)
("[R]esearch regularly shows that the best predictor of crime is prior criminal behavior" and that
the differences between people, with respect to the likelihood they will commit criminal acts,
persist over time);  JOHN MONAHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 71-72 (1981) ("If there is one finding that
overshadows all others in the area of prediction, it is that the probability of future crime increases
with each prior criminal act.")  
280
“The figures suggest that recidivism rates cannot be affected by varying the severity of the
punishment, at least within acceptable Limits.”  Daniel Nagin, GENERAL DETERRENCE: A REVIEW OF THE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND
INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS 96 (1978).
281 It seems likely, for example, that persons who are prone to criminal acts are also prone to an
unrealistically low estimate of  the danger of getting caught and the cost of future punishment.  See
Michael R. Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime, passim and 107 (1990) 
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ante consequences of the rule, if they exist at all, are highly speculative and
unpredictable. 
Next, we look at questionable economic ideas about character evidence. Posner
argues that prior-crime evidence “is only weakly probative, because repeat offenders are
punished more heavily than first-time offenders in part precisely to offset any greater
propensity to commit crimes that their previous convictions have revealed. If recidivists
are punished severely enough, the propensity to commit a subsequent offense may be
reduced to the same level as the propensity to commit a first offense.”278
This proposition – that previously convicted defendants, if punished severely
enough, will not be any more likely to commit crime than persons with clean records –
would seem to merit a look at the empirical evidence. It requires justification in view of
data showing that previously convicted defendants are dozens or hundreds of times
more likely to commit an offense than are persons chosen at random.279 It contradicts
the empirically documented view that recidivism is not much affected by increases in
severity of punishment.280 Just proposing new ideas based upon a rational choice model,
under which potential offenders apparently make a reasonable assessment of the value
of present gratification compared to future punishment,281 can be positively misleading to
282 Park, supra note ___, at 2057-58.
283
 Posner, supra note ___, at 1530-31.  
284 Allen & Leiter, supra note ___ at 1521-27.
285 Sanchirico, supra note ___.
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policymakers unless the scholar is willing to check his assumptions against potentially
disconfirming data.282
Marital privilege is another area where Posner’s analysis sometimes gets out of
control, requiring more human foresight, knowledge and flexibility than is plausible. I
doubt that even law professors consult the rules about marital privilege before confiding
in their spouses or committing a crime, but Posner has ordinary people doing both.283
We agree with Allen and Leiter that Judge Posner’s article is prone to rootless
theorizing.284 We cannot say for certain that these are incorrect, flawed ideas. We can
say that, if the reality of human behavior is important to evidence policy, and hypotheses
are to be tested, then one has to have some idea about which hypotheses are plausible
enough to be worth the effort. One could regard the passages discussed above as
saying: I’m not asserting this is true, I’m just showing you where the model leads, I’m just
throwing out ideas for you ordinary scholars to check out. But in deciding whether to
seek empirical verification of ideas, one has to make some choices about what to test.   
Guidance could come from theory, analogous studies, fireside inductions from history
and experience, and intuition. With those preliminary screening tools as our guide, not
many of Posner’s economic ideas about evidence law appear promising. 
In contrast to Posner’s shotgun approach to applying economic ideas to evidence
law, the next two articles use a laser: they zero in on one doctrine and work it over
extensively. The first reflects the characteristic concern of contemporary law and
economics with the impact of incentives and disincentives on individual behavior by
deliberately looking away from the fact-finding function of evidence rules to consider the
arguable impact of that rule on (mostly) crime deterrence.285 More specifically, Professor
Sanchirico argues that the rule prohibiting the use of character evidence offered to
persuade a factfinder that (consistent with the trait of character) the person performed
the act at issue is a rule that cannot be explained coherently or convincingly in terms of
enhancing the accuracy of trial fact-finding. He reviews each of the major extant truth-
focused explanations for the rule and argues that they are unconvincing, to wit: the
limited probative value of character evidence, the strong tendency of the jury to
overweight such evidence, the imposition of liability for the defendant’s character rather
than for the wrongful conduct charged, judicial efficiency, an effort to impel parties to
produce more and better evidence directed toward the conduct at issue, and trial bias (a
286 We need not delay with a critique of his critiques. Except to say that the traditional
explanations do not strike us as so weak as Sanchirico asserts. Sanchirico, like most of us, holds rival
theories to higher standards of validity than he holds his own. Interested readers will have to decide for
themselves whether Sanchirico has reached the right verdict on each theory, including his own. 
287 Id. at 1232.
288 No one disagrees with this proposition. Even those who regard character evidence as a weak
predictor of behavior do not say that it has zero predictive value. 
289 Evidence left by the commission of an act, including the memories of eyewitnesses. 
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biased distribution of persons selected for prosecution which further reduces the
inferential value of character evidence).286
Sanchirico then offers a new explanation for the rule, one rooted in the notion that
trials in general, and this rule in particular, are devices for dispensing primary incentives.
In order to explain the rule coherently, all we need do is analyze the character evidence
ban in light of  its ability to deter undesirable conduct, rather than its ability to lead
factfinders closer to truth:
Character evidence... is one area in which the truth seeking approach and
the primary incentives approach to trial point in very different directions. 
This Article makes use of that divergence to advance our understanding of
both character evidence and trial.  It demonstrates that many of the rules
governing character evidence – so difficult to rationalize when trial is
regarded as an isolated exercise in sorting out past events – fall easily into
place when trial is viewed as but one component of the larger system by
which the state regulates everyday out of court behavior.  The Article
draws from this stark disparity in explanatory power the important lesson
that, despite most of what is said about the object of trial, our desire to find
the truth is subordinate to our desire, in effect, to shape it through the
provision of incentives.287
The essential argument of Sanchirico’s theory about the character evidence ban
is this: Character evidence has predictive and therefore probative value.288 But it has no
incentive value: its presence or absence creates no incentive to refrain from proscribed
acts. “Trace evidence,”289 on the other hand, generally comes into being by the
commission of proscribed acts and generally does not when such acts are not
performed. Thus, trace evidence has incentive value. By focusing on trace evidence, the
law reinforces the disincentive to committing proscribed acts. Were character evidence
permitted as evidence of conduct, the disincentive for performing proscribed acts would
be dampened. Without a character evidence ban, a person with a “bad” character is in a
“damned if you do and damned if you don’t” situation. If he refrains from the proscribed
290 The most prominent example is the relatively recent exceptions admitting evidence of an
accused’s propensity to engage in proscribed sexual conduct. According to the economic analysis of this
article, these rules will increase rather than decrease the disincentive to commit such crimes. 
291 Id. at 1259.
292 See supra note ___.
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behavior, he still could be convicted of a relevant crime based on the evidence that he is
more likely than others to commit such crimes. But with a character evidence ban in
place, refraining from proscribed acts has greater power to prevent conviction (since the
trace evidence necessary for conviction will not exist) and therefore the person is more
likely to refrain. Thus, deterrence is stronger with the rule against character evidence
than without it. 
Sanchirico’s theory is plausible in accounting for the relevant law, at least to the
extent that the assumptions are valid. What is less plausible is that judges, facing an
issue of whether evidence should be admitted or excluded from trial, presented with
arguments from counsel about accuracy versus fairness, and despite writing opinions
which consider the problem in those terms, are nevertheless, somehow, solving the
dilemma with entirely different goals in mind, and that the most influential (if not most)
judges were collectively engaged in the unexpressed enterprise (talk about in-court
accuracy versus fairness but adopt rules calculated for out-of-court deterrence). Not
impossible, but surely improbable.
Sanchirico uses the basic incentivist notion to explain the wisdom of an array of
related rules: the admissibility of character evidence for impeachment, at sentencing, for
punitive damages, exceptions to the character evidence rule that make sense from a
deterrence perspective, and exceptions to the character evidence rule that do not make
sense from a deterrence perspective.290
The article illustrates an important value of a “new” discipline’s meta-theoretical
imperatives. Because it is the concern of microeconomic analysis to search for
incentives and consider their effects, Sanchirico was led to look away from the trial’s
apparent internal quest (for true facts) and look instead to the effects of the rule outside
of the trial; from seeing the rule as part of a backward-looking search for truth to seeing
it as a forward-looking tool of social control.
Although Sanchirico focuses on one rule, he argues that his analysis is illustrative
of a larger truth about trials: they are more concerned with “influencing what happens in
the future than discovering what happened in the past.”291 That is a bold departure from
(and challenge to) the heretofore nearly unanimous evidence scholarship of the past
several hundred years.292 Whether it can be shown to be true we will have to wait and
293 Daniel Seidmann and Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2004).
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see. But who cannot be excited by the debates promised by so grand a claim, whether it
ultimately proves to be true or false?
The final work of economic analysis of evidence doctrine that we will consider
succeeds in combining traditional evidence scholarship’s core concern of accurate
factfinding with a “consequentialist, game-theoretic perspective.”293 Professors
Seidmann and Stein explore the question of whether the right of criminal defendants to
remain silent benefits only guilty defendants or whether it creates conditions that assist
factfinders in distinguishing innocent from guilty defendants and therefore benefits
courts and society (by reducing the incidence of erroneous convictions). Critics of the
right to silence dating back at least to Bentham have argued that innocent suspects and
defendants do not need the right (they desire to offer true exculpatory evidence), and
that only the guilty will avail themselves of it, thus increasing the incidence of erroneous
acquittals. Defenders of the right to silence have defended it on a completely different
plane, arguing that regardless of any costs in accuracy it may entail, the right is
necessary to promote moral and ethical values of fair process. 
Seidmann and Stein’s economic analysis finds a defense of the right to silence
that had been overlooked by both utilitarian critics and libertarian defenders. The critics
of the right to silence made a series of economic miscalculations; the defenders may
have turned to moral and ethical arguments because the erroneous reasoning of the
critics appeared so persuasive. In any event, consequentialist game theory analysis has
led to a new and utilitarian explanation for and defense of the right to silence. 
To summarize: If they were compelled to submit to interrogations and to testify,
guilty suspects and defendants would tell lies in an effort to avoid conviction. Whenever
police or prosecutors are unable to expose those lies, the guilty would be
indistinguishable from the innocent. Jurors and judges, aware that guilty (as well as
innocent) defendants were offering exculpatory statements, would discount those
statements, giving all of them less weight. With the right to silence, guilty suspects face
the choice of telling lies that could be discovered (adding to the evidence against them)
or exercising their right to silence. As more guilty defendants choose the option of
remaining silent, they do not “pool with” innocent suspects and defendants.
Consequently, innocent and guilty suspects and defendants become more
distinguishable. Thus, the right to silence helps the innocent as well as the guilty.
Further analysis suggests that these effects are most likely to occur when the
prosecution’s evidence is moderately inculpatory (rather than weak or strong), and it
works only when the standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt” (rather than some
lower threshold). Indeed, the authors argue that not only would a reduction in the
294 Id. at 449.
295 For examples: Schmerber (the right to silence protects only against compelled testimony, not
against compelled production of physical evidence); Jenkins-Fletcher (permitting adverse inferences
from pre-arrest silence); Griffin (prohibiting adverse inferences from refusal to testify); Mitchell (the
right to silence applies in sentencing proceedings).
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standard of proof lead to more erroneous convictions, “but also serious indeterminacy in
suspect identification and selection.”294
The authors argue that their analysis fits well with, and supports, or explains, not
only the basic fifth amendment right of silence, but much of the jurisprudence that has
grown up around it.295
The game theory analysis consists largely of thinking through the strategies of
innocent and guilty suspects and defendants under varying conditions of evidence,
standard of proof, and some other variables. These are plausible, reasonable arguments
about what suspects and defendants and factfinders would do. But they rarely are
296 For examples: Regarding the assumption that innocent suspects tell exonerating truths:  To
what extent do innocent suspects lie also, in order to add a margin of safety to their factual innocence,
only to get caught in the lie? (Doesn’t that vitiate anti-pooling effects?) Regarding the assumption that
suspects can assess the evidence against them: To what extent do police lie to suspects about the
evidence they have? (If often, doesn’t that make it difficult if not impossible for innocent as well as
guilty suspects to evaluate what their “move” should be?) Regarding the assumption that only in the
“rare” case, with abnormal people or abnormal circumstances, do the police so confuse or intimidate
suspects that they cannot make rational calculations about their own best moves: To what extent do
police interrogation techniques succeed in confusing or intimidating typical suspects into making foolish
choices, including making inculpatory statements (which, after all, is exactly what they are designed to
do)? Regarding the assumption that “the typical suspect confesses to crime only when confronted with
evidence that he believes to be irrefutable.” To what extent is this true?  Will guilty subjects choose to
continue to remain silent even if inferences based on silence are allowed – for example, because they
have no convincing story, or because prior convictions will become admissible?   If the guilty did speak
instead of confessing or remaining silent, would their tales  be as convincing as those of the innocent?
See Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist
on the Right to Silence, 35 INDIANA L. REV. 925, 956-60 (2002).  Is it plausible to believe simultaneously
that fact-finders obey the instruction not to draw adverse inferences from silence to an extent that
encourages guilty defendants to remain silent, and also  that the right to silence favors the innocent by
making fact-finders more likely to believe their stories? See Id. at 942. 
The answer the authors are likely to give is that so long as a plurality of the actual behavior is
consistent with their assumptions, their theory still has predictive and explanatory value. 
But it is worth reminding ourselves about the value of data. One illustration of the usefulness of
combining data on actual behavior with game theory is provided by ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION (1985). Axelrod conducted a game theory contest in which entrants submitted
programs designed to elicit cooperative responses from the opponent in the game. Naturally, many
entries were based on theories sans data. The winning entry, it turned out, was from a psychologist who
knew from empirical experiments on game theory games what the most successful strategy is for eliciting
cooperation from an opponent, and wrote a simple program to play that strategy. That winning strategy: 
tit-for-tat.
297
 Though Posner has, in another context, urged that theoretical assumptions and hypotheses be
empirically and rigorously tested with data. Richard Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods
of Alternative dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 366  (1986).
298
 Seidmann and Stein themselves declare half of the data to be useless: “too contaminated with
measurement error (including inconsistent classification schemes) to draw any meaningful
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informed by empirical data about such behavior. They could be incorrect.296 This, of
course, is typical of economic analysis of law.297
Uncharacteristically, Seidmann and Stein do offer a brief section which purports
to test the implications of their theory against empirical data. Though the section seems
to be an afterthought, and not much intellectual energy is put into it, at least it is there.
But the data are tenuous298 and presented in a way that is confusing if not contradictory.
conclusions....” Supra note ___, at 500.
299 Id. at n. 60.
300 Id. at 501.
301 In the paper’s introduction, the authors dismissed the empirical approach: 
A factual examination of these assumptions may follow two principal routes. 
One of these routes is empirical.  By gathering and analyzing relevant empirical data, one
can evaluate the workings of the right to silence without relying on sheer intuition.  Such
an approach might determine, statistically or by any other epistemologically plausible
standard, whether the right aids only the guilty.  The alternative route, which this Article
follows, is behavioral modeling.  Such modeling is usually, but not exclusively, based on
rational-choice theory.  Because reliable empirical evidence is often unavailable, the
empirical approach is often problematic, as is the case with the factual assumptions
examined by this Article.  For example, it is extremely difficult, if not altogether
impossible, to estimate the effect of the right to silence on the rate of true and false
confessions.  A suspect may confess to a crime for a variety of reasons.  He may confess
to a crime truthfully on finding the incriminating evidence irresistible.  Alternatively, he
may make a false or a truthful confession under the pressure of police questioning.  *437
He may also make a false confession to exonerate the actual guilty party (for example,
out of fear or love).  A suspect deciding to remain silent during his interrogation may do
so regardless of the right to silence: silence would be the best strategy for many guilty
suspects even in the absence of a right. 
An even greater problem inherent in the empirical approach lies in its limited
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From the data mish mosh they draw the conclusion that the two predictions they derive
from their model are confirmed.
Perhaps the most telling finding (the import of which is not noted by Seidmann
and Stein) is that few suspects refuse to answer police questions. Two American studies
found 9.5% and 20.9%.299 British studies found about 10%, and the presence or
absence of a prosecution right to argue adverse inferences changes that number only a
few percent.300 If the actual figure is around 10%, and the claimed benefits are found
only when the inculpatory evidence is moderate, then we are taking about a few percent
of cases. If the vast majority of suspects talk even when they have a right to silence,
then presumably most of them are offering the police lies which falsely tend to
exonerate. Does that not create quite a lot of the very pooling that the article argues is
prevented by the right to silence? But if so many (presumably) guilty suspects lie rather
than avail themselves of their right to silence, then Bentham and his followers are also
pretty far off the mark.
Which again suggests to us that economists of the law have not escaped the
need to be more concerned about data. Economic models are not the royal road to truth,
and need to be tested more earnestly.301 Of course this is no different from most legal
ability to produce determinate predictions when applied to human actions and decisions. 
There is no good reason to believe that uniformly observed actions and decisions will
continue in the future.  Reliance on statistical generalizations in forecasting human
actions may prove perilous: recall Bertrand Russell's (in)famous chicken, conditioned to
expect its daily feeding until the day the farmer interrupted this routine by butchering it
for meat. One can make predictions about human actions only within some theoretical
framework that imposes order on the empirically gathered facts. Generalizations about
human actions acquire plausibility only by virtue of some explanatory theory that
connects actions to reasons.  Theoretical lenses may be microscopic or macroscopic,
depending on the desired level of abstraction.  In a search for a causal mechanism that
explains numerous actions by their underlying motivations, theoretical lenses must be at
a relatively high level of abstraction.  This form of reductionism is necessary to tame
"wild facts" and is, therefore, intrinsic to behavioral modeling.  The compromised
accuracy resulting from this reductionism is the price that any behavioral theory (and,
perhaps, any theory) exacts in order to attain determinacy.
Id. at 436-437.
302 Cf., Posner, supra note ___.
303 See Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas B. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
304For examples of doctrinal scholarship and comments on its usefulness, see Roger C.
Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REV. 849, 859-70 (1991) 
305A count supervised by one of the authors of this article indicates that there were 23
doctrinal texts and treatises on evidence law  in print in 1957-58 (25,416 pages), compared to
207 texts and treatises in 2001-02 (150,833 pages), a page increase of 593%. (Casebooks and
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scholarship, and it would be unfair to lay any special criticism on the doorstep of
Seidmann and Stein or of devotees of law and economics.302
A concluding comment on law and economics and evidence scholarship more
generally, or perhaps a suggestion, is this. What we’ve seen so far usually uses a strong
version of rational choice theory.  But since evidence scholars are usually alert to the
nonrational flaws in human reasoning, why not a weak version?  Why not the bounded
rationality of behavioral law and economics?303 Perhaps that will be the next turn. 
Conclusion: The Interdisciplinary Future of Evidence Scholarship
Evidence scholarship in the leading law reviews is no longer predominantly
doctrinal scholarship about rules.  That is, it is no longer  scholarship that focuses  on
analyzing and synthesizes rules,  or on using  skills taught in law school to argue that 
rules should be improved  or reconceptualized. 304   Although doctrinal scholarship   lives
on – indeed, flourishes –   in  treatises305 and in less prestigious law reviews,306 the best-
commercial outlines were not counted). The data collection was accomplished by identifying 
doctrinal evidence books that were listed in the 1957 and 1958 editions of LAW BOOKS IN PRINT
(Glanville Publishers) and the 2001-02 edition of BOOKS IN PRINT (Bowker).  Books that were 
unfamiliar to the principal investigator  were judged by their titles.  For the second period, page
counting was not practical for some works, so the investigators estimated page length based on
the mean length of the volumes for which data  was available.  These estimates counted for
26,232 of the 150,833 pages counted in the second period. 
306See Michael Saks, Howard Larsen and Carol Hodne, Is There a Growing Gap Among
Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles
One Generation Apart,  30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353 (1996).  The authors found that there were
nearly twice   as many “practical” articles in 1986 as in 1960, a period during which the number
of primary law reviews had nearly tripled.  Id. at 373.  The biggest change in content away from
doctrinal scholarship occurred  in the top quintile of law reviews (in terms of prestige as
measured by the size of library).  Id. at 374. 
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known law reviews will probably continue to move away from doctrinal scholarship in
favor of interdisciplinary work. 
307 Professor Lawrence Friedman has written: “To begin with, empirical research is hard work,
and lots of it; it is also nonlibrary research, and many law teachers are afraid of it; it calls for skills that
most law teachers do not have; if it is at all elaborate, it is team research, and law teachers are not used
to this kind of effort; often it requires hustling grant money from foundations or government agencies,
and law teachers simply do not know how to do that. . . . Prestige is a factor too. Law schools . . . tend to
exalt "theory" over applied research. Empirical research has an applied air to it, compared to "legal
theory." Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 774 (1986).
308 See Peter Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 323 (1989).
309 The State Justice Institute, the National Institute of Justice. The National Science Foundation
has been more supportive.
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What is the future of interdisciplinary evidence scholarship? Let’s consider some
of the specific forms.
First, empirical studies, often the province of psychology research but not
exclusively. The concern of some evidence scholars is that a variety of barriers will
prevent this kind of interdisciplinary work from flourishing. These concerns are, among
other things, that law professors have no training in empirical research and analysis, that
even if they did they do not have students who are in a position to assist in carrying out
such research, that funds are lacking to support such research, and that the traditions of
single authorship and of grand theory scholarship militate against empirical work.307 In
short, empirical research does not suit the scholarly habits of law professors – who
rarely ventured beyond the law library, and now with so many resources online they
need not even leave their offices – and support of various kinds in lacking for the doing
of such research.308
There are two basic ways to overcome these sorts of problems. Evidence
scholars who are sufficiently interested in testing evidence law assumptions empirically
will either have to acquire the skills and the assistance  to perform such work, or they will
have to form collaborations with colleagues in other departments who already have
those skills. Examples of both can be given. Availability of funding may be more of an
obstacle. Federal funding agencies309 have not seen improvement in law or the trial
system as a priority for the dollars they have to spend. Or perhaps there has been too
little demand for those resources for the kinds of research needed to test and advance
evidence doctrine. Lawyers usually are resourceful enough to overcome these kinds of
difficulties, but there is no gainsaying such problems.
310 Lempert, supra note ___ at 1709.
311 William C. Thompson & E.L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal
Trials: the Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 L. & Hum. Behav. 167 (1986).
312 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 75
(1990); Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by DNA Match Statistics? 15 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 493 (2001). 
313 Shari Seidman Diamond and Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87
VA. L. REV. 1857, 1888-89 (2001).
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Richard Lempert raises a more specific methodological concern about empirical
research in the field of evidence: “With the exception of some psychologists, few
scholars have attempted to shed any empirical light on evidentiary issues. One reason
for our lack of empirical knowledge is that it is hard to study the effects of evidence rules
outside the laboratory, and laboratory studies raise substantial external validity
problems.”310  Whether the issue of generalizability is greater here than in other kinds of
laboratory simulation research is not clear. And the problem sometimes exists and
sometimes does not exist. It seems to us that numerous research questions can be
studied without running into very serious questions of generalizability. One could do
simulation studies about how, for example, people reason about evidence, such as
studies of the prosecutor’s fallacy, the defense attorney’s fallacy,311 or Koehler’s
experiments on how people reason about probability.312 Where the question is
generalizability from the research participants, when the task is one requiring intellect
and it is failed by undergraduates, one would think the failure results would generalize to
lay juries. Other times, experiments can and have been done using jurors. In addition,
one can do field studies on how juries reason about evidence.  One example is a study
of jury deliberations by Shari Diamond and Neil Vidmar, in which they found, by
recording the deliberations, that jurors did not talk about using insurance coverage to
find deep pockets, but rather they talked about whether the plaintiff had insurance that
would provide a collateral source for compensation.313
As more and more scholars and judges come to appreciate that without such
research their rulemaking and their rulings are little more than guesses, we suspect that
more ways will be found to conduct more of the necessary research.
Second, evidence law and forensic science (or science generally). This field will
obviously keep flourishing with the scientization of society and the growing realization
that much of what the courts had been accepting through the 20th Century was seriously
inadequate. Moreover, Daubert might teach us something about the scientific method
that will make us more able and willing to become involved in the empirical studies of
evidence. 
314 The contrast is to most kinds of empirical research, which require more qualitatively different
activities.
315 Lempert, supra note ___ at 1637-38 (citations omitted).
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Third, the “new evidence scholarship. Some topics seem to have run (or over-run)
their course, such as the blue bus and gatecrasher problems. Topics involving the study
of inference and decision-making have unrealized potential and will probably continue to
be growth areas.  For example, we expect to see further efforts to upgrade Wigmorean
charting and further work on computer-aided pretrial fact analysis. Bayes will live on,
both as an aid in thinking about evidence law and, among Bayesian enthusiasts, as a
tool in fact analysis. But, because the decisions of humans (jurors and judges) are not
well explained or predicted by Bayesian approaches, watch for the further incorporation
of cognitive science and the arrival of artificial intelligence into these projects – to the
extent that these new sciences provide more accurate predictions of how judges will rule
and how jurors will infer. We also are unlikely to see Bayes' theorem in trials themselves,
where many items of evidence are involved and an expert has to explain to the factfinder
how to apply the theory.
Fourth, concerning evidence and feminism, we expect that this area will continue
and grow to the same extent that an intellectual tradition regarded as distinctly feminist
continues and grows. It may tend to concentrate on areas of evidence that are of special
concern to women (sexual assault, obviously), but it will be useful both to the scholars
and to the law of evidence if they move beyond those limited areas. There certainly is no
reason why evidence law should not be as susceptible to continued feminist analysis as
it is to analysis through the lens of any other field. In some ways, feminist legal analysis
has the same advantage that traditional legal analysis and much law and economics
analysis had, namely, that it is an armchair activity that can be carried on by taking a set
of ideas and using them as a lens with which to examine the law.314
Fifth, of Law and Economics, Richard Lempert sees little future. He writes: 
[M]ajor funders of law and economics seem to have a pro-business,
antiregulation, and/or generally conservative political agenda they wish to
promote. Although the Olin Foundation's support of... intellectual activities
that promote no coherent social agenda are contrary to my hypothesis, I
still do not believe that evidence law will be a high priority for support
among law and economics research funders.  Not only does evidence law
not deal with issues that are at the core of what funders hope to establish
through economic research, but, as Posner points out, when the lamp of
economics shines on evidence law, what it reveals is not necessarily
compatible with conservative or big business political agendas. Posner, for
example, argues that a law and economics perspective supports the
institution of jury trial, a message that business supporters of law and
economics are unlikely to relish.315
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Lempert might be wrong, at least in the short term and at least concerning law and
economics articles of the theoretical type (not law and economics articles involving
empirical research). Theoretical law and economics articles do not require any more
funding than doctrinal scholarship, and the elite law journals are fond of them. And there
is no reason to think that scholars like Chris Sanchirico or Alex Stein will stop writing
about it.
